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NICHOLAS CALCINA HOWSON*

Enforcement without Foundation?-Insider Trading
and China's Administrative Law Crisist
China's securities regulator enforces insider tradingprohibitions
pursuant to non-legal and non-regulatory internal "guidance." Reported agency decisions indicate that enforcement against insider
trading is often possible only pursuant to this guidance, as the behavior identified is far outside of the scope of insider trading liability
provided for in statute or regulation.
I argue that the agency guidance is itself unlawful and unenforceable, because: (i) the guidance is not the regulatory norm required by
the statutory delegation of power; and (ii) the guidance is ultra vires
because (a) it addresses something substantively different from what
is authorized under the statutory delegation, and (b) because the guidance radically transforms the underlying basis for the breach of
insider tradingunder Chinese law-from a modified "classical"Ifiduciary duty plus misappropriationtheory to an extremely robust "equal
access"I mere possession of inside information theory.
I then outline potential Chinese law challenges to the norms and
their enforcement, and analyze why there is such marked tolerance to
plainly illegal rule-making and enforcement by what is commonly understood to be one of China's best administrativeagencies.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. In composing this Article, I have benefited from the insights of Professors Donald Clarke, Cui Wei, Keith
Hand, Jamie Horsley, Huang Hui, Victoria Langland, Benjamin Liebman, Neysun
Mahboubi, Curtis Milhaupt, Mathias Reimann, Shen Kui, and Alex Wang, two anonymous reviewers, and the good comments and questions received at workshop
meetings convened by the Yale Law School Center for the Study of Corporate Law
and the Yale Law School China Law Center in December 2011 and by the Berkeley
Law School Center for Law, Business and the Economy and the Berkeley Center for
Chinese Studies in February 2012. I also thank Zhang Xiaomeng of the Michigan Law
School Library for her extraordinary help in tracking down electronic sources for
many of the laws and regulations referred to here. All translations from Chinese into
English, or vice versa, are by the author. For this Article, I have modified the standard pinyin Romanization for some Chinese terms to enhance ease of reading for
those who do not know Chinese. Thus, the character sets properly rendered in pinyin
Romanization as "guiding"(the verb "to regulate" or the noun "legislative provisions")
and "fading"(meaning "stipulated in law") are written "gui'ding"and "fa'ding"so as
to avoid conjuring the italicized English words in the phrases "the guiding light" or
"the fading light."
t DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.5131/AJCL.2012.0011
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The infirmity underlying the basis for well-governed and investor-attractingcapital markets identified here has implications not
only for China's securities regulation regime and healthy market development, but also for the entirety of China's legal and
administrativelaw system in the reform era.
INTRODUCTION

The securities regulator of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
enforces statutory insider trading prohibitions pursuant to an internal norm it calls a "guidance document." Indeed, published agency
decisions sanctioning private actors for insider trading demonstrate
that enforcement is often possible only pursuant to this agency "guidance," because the culpable trading behavior is very different from
the specific and more limited actions addressed in the operative Chinese statute. This enforcement reality is highly problematic not only
because it sees a key PRC administrative agency acting far outside
the scope of its legal authority, but also because the agency guidance
is itself illegal and should be unenforceable.
In this Article, I argue that agency enforcement against insider
trading in China is illegal for several reasons. First, the PRC's securities regulator-the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC)-has not created or publicly issued a legal or regulatory
norm which conforms to the statutory authorization "to regulate" or
"to stipulate in regulation" (gui'ding)1 a narrow part of statutorilybased insider trading liability. Second, the non-legal, non-regulatory,
guidance offered by the CSRC in response to the statutory command
"to regulate" or "to stipulate in regulation" is ultra vires because: (i) it
goes beyond the limited object of the relevant statutory authorization-designation of additional "persons with knowledge of inside
information"; and (ii) it departs completely from the statute-based
structure of China's insider trading prohibition-in U.S. jurisprudential terms, the CSRC guidance provides for a Texas Gulf Sulphur
theory of liability (targeting anyone who trades while simply in possession of inside information), whereas the statute provides only for a
narrow version of Cady, Roberts/ Chiarella liability (applicable only
to specific insiders identified in, or pursuant to, the statute) plus
what aspires to be O'Hagen-style misappropriation liability.2
1. As Chinese readers and speakers will understand, the Chinese characters for
the verbs "to regulate" or "to stipulate in regulation" (gui'ding)analyzed here are embedded in an adjectival phrase to describe "other persons." Which "other persons"?
Those persons stipulated in regulation.Notwithstanding this grammatical characterization, or that the Chinese characters in question are not used in a pure verb form in
the relevant statutory provision, it remains appropriate to explore the meaning and
legal implications of the verb form "to regulate" or "to stipulate in regulation"
(gui'ding).
2. See Part II infra for an elaborated discussion of this conflict.
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At the most immediate level, this phenomenon presents significant problems for China's securities regulator and its oversight of the
PRC's dynamic capital markets. The illegality of insider trading enforcement norms casts a shadow over the ability of the PRC securities
regulator to govern China's capital markets, and to thereby ensure
the perceived transparency and information symmetry critical to sustaining investor confidence and participation. Any successful legal
challenge to Chinese enforcement of insider trading prohibitions by
defendants would constitute a body blow to this regulator's hardearned reputation for competence, regulatory power, and technical
sophistication, and confirm what many small investors already understand as the unlevel playing field characterizing China's "casino"
markets. Moreover, it would only contribute to a familiar vicious circle whereby the apparent ex ante costs of engaging in insider trading
are virtually nil, encouraging expanded illegal activity going forward.
At a broader level, however, this seemingly technical, narrowly
securities law-related, issue is but the specific identity of a much
larger dysfunction that exists in many other areas of the PRC's applied legal and administrative law system. Accordingly, this problem
has much wider implications for China's three decades-old "legal construction" project, the PRC's declared intention to "administer
according to law" (yifa xingzheng), and what some understand as pervasive and increasing illegality across that nation's entire legal and

governance system. The illegality and unenforceability of China's insider trading norms-as conceived and implemented by what many
recognize as the PRC's first "modern" and most technically competent
regulatory agency-and the relative tolerance shown by defendants
for such illegal enforcement, provide observers with significant insights into what the Chinese contemporary legal order actually is.
The prevalence of these very issues sparked articulated central
government policy and legislative concern more than a decade ago, as
embodied in the 1996 PRC Law on Administrative Punishments,3 the
PRC State Council's 2004 Outline for Implementing the Full Promotion of Administration According to Law, 4 the 2008 State Council
3. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Chufa Fa [PRC Law on Administrative Punishments] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 17, 1996, effective
Oct. 1, 1996), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&ID=
1148.
4. Guowuyuan Guanyu Yinfa Quanmian Tuijin Yifa Xingzheng Shishi Gangyao
De Tongzhi [State Council Notice Regarding Printing and Distribution of the Outline
for Implementing the Full Promotion of Administration According to Law] (promulgated by the St. Council, Aug. 31, 2006), available at http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/yfxzl
content_374160.htm [hereinafter, Administration According to Law Outline]. See,
e.g., paragraphs 1 (exhorting "administration according to law" (yifa xingzheng) and
criticizing "illegal or inappropriate administrative action"); 5(i) (urging administrative agencies to act in accordance with law, administrative regulations or
departmental rules, and forbidding administrative action not stipulated in law, administrative regulations or departmental rules); 5(iii) (calling for "due process"
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Regulations on Open Government Information,5 and the very recent
2010 State Council Opinion Regarding Strengthening the Construction of Rule of Law Government. 6 As the problem persists in many
areas of government administration, it has also drawn the long-overdue attention of PRC legal and administrative law scholars, and even
the Chinese implementing agencies concerned. 7 As the PRC State
Council stated very clearly in its 2010 pronouncement, ensuring that
administrative rule-making and administrative law enforcement operate within the bounds described in "law" is at the very core of "rule
of law government" (fazhi zhengfu) and the "rule of law" (yifa zhiguo).
This Article is organized as follows: Part I introduces the problem of insider trading, and enforcement against it, in China today,
and then sets forth the formal statutory and purported regulatory bases for enforcement since the early 1990s and the establishment of
China's domestic equity capital markets. Part II reveals the conflicted approach to insider trading enforcement in China as between
the statutory regime, on one hand, and a 2007 norm issued internally
(chengxu zhengdang) and urging administrative agencies to "act publicly" (yingdang
gongkai) in their administrative tasks); 5(v) (stipulating that administrative agencies
may only undertake enforcement within the scope authorized in law or administrative regulations); 16 (calling for greater openness in rule-making, and publication of
all enforceable norms in a government gazette); 20, 26, 28 and 30 (encouraging private claims for administrative rehearing or administrative litigation); 23 (limiting
enforcement powers to the scope stipulated in law); 29 ((central) "filing for the record"
system for departmental rules and "normative documents"), etc.
5. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Tiaoli [Regulations of
the PRC on Open Government Information] (promulgated by the St. Council, Apr. 5,
2007, effective May 1, 2008), art. 33(2), availableat http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&ID=6011, which create a presumption that government
information, including rules and regulations, should be disclosed, and establishes a
legal mechanism that citizens may use to compel disclosure, including administrative
litigation.
6. Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Fazhi Zhengfu Jianshe De Yijian [State Council Opinion Regarding Strengthening the Construction of Rule of Law Government]
(issued by the St. Council, Nov. 8, 2010), available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/201011/08/content 1740765.htm [hereinafter, Rule of Law Government Opinion]. See, e.g.,
paras. 1 ("administration according to law" (yifa xingzheng) a key component of "rule
of law" (yifa zhiguo), and the construction of a "rule of law government" (fazhi
zhengfu); descrying mal-administration or chaotic application of administrative law
and unfair application of administrative norms, or administrative agencies acting ultra vires); 6 (improve government rule-making); 7 (respect legally-stipulated
constraints on power, and implement due process); 8 (review and rectify administrative regulations, departmental rules and normative documents); 9 (improve the
formulation of normative documents, ensuring they are firmly based in law and do
not increase civil obligations outside of those stipulated in law; normative documents
not issued for comment or subject to hearings, etc., prior to enforcement are not enforceable); 10 (improve "filing and review" (bei'an shencha) system for administrative
regulations and departmental rules, publicly declare invalid regulations and rules
that do not conform with law); and Section VI (increase open government), etc.
7. See, e.g., Wei Cui, What is the "Law" in Chinese Tax Administration?, 19 AsiA
PAC. L. REv. 75 (2011) (noting the same phenomenon with respect to the issuance and
application of ultra vires tax "circulars" by the PRC Ministry of Finance and the State
Taxation Administration, and the latter department's July 2010 regulation designed
to rationalize and legalize tax rule-making).
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by the agency charged with enforcement, on the other. In Part III, I
analyze the legality and thus enforceability of that 2007 norm, and
find it to be seriously deficient, making enforcement subject to legal
challenge. Referring to administrative sanction decisions reported by
the CSRC, Part IV reveals that the 2007 norms, which I argue are
illegal and unenforceable, are very often the sole basis upon which
enforcement of China's insider trading prohibitions is implemented.
Part V provides a discussion of how, under Chinese law, the CSRC
norms could be ruled void or unenforceable, or specific enforcement of
them be overturned on appeal, with a summary outline of the possible Chinese law challenges to enforcement action (administrative and
criminal) based upon such norms. In Part VI, I conclude with a
broader meditation on what this problem means for China's three decades-long "legal construction" project and what it reveals about
China's authentic legal, administrative law, and governance systems.
Several CSRC insider trading enforcement decisions referred to in
Part IV are summarized in Appendix I, and the most important statutory and non-regulatory norm provisions referred to in this study
are collected in Appendix II for ease of reference.
I.

INSIDER TRADING IN CHINA AND LEGAL BASES FOR ENFORCEMENT

A.

Insider Trading and Enforcement in China

Securities fraud, including specifically insider trading, is an acknowledged fact of the Chinese domestic capital markets, and has
been since the establishment of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges in 1990-1991. Insider trading takes many forms in China.
Certainly the classic situation-where corporate insiders use nonpublic material information from and regarding their company to
trade in the stock of the same company prior to an announcement
affecting the market price of that company's securities-is understood to occur very frequently.8
8. See, e.g., Hui Huang, The Regulation of Insider Trading in China: A Critical
Review and Proposalsfor Reform, 17 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 281, 285, 286-87 (2005) (citing
to Wu HONG ET AL., ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG FAZHAN DE FALio TIAOKONG
[LEGAL ADJUSTMENTS FOR FHE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S SECURITIES MARKET] 12
(2001)); Ling Huawei, Qiao Xiaohui, Fu Tao & Hu Runfeng, Neimu Jiaoyi "Wenyi"
[The Insider Trading "Plague"], CAIJING, May 28, 2007, at 66-69; Shen Han, A Com-

parative Study of Insider Trading RegulationEnforcement in the U.S. and China, 9 J.
Bus. & SEC. L. 41, 56-60 (2007); Gady Epstein, Market Maker, FORBES, Jan. 28, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/global/2008/0128/050.html; Nicholas Calcina Howson, Punishing Possession-China'sAll-Embracing Insider Trading Enforcement Regime, in
INSIDER TRADING RESEARCH HANDBOOK 2-3 (Stephen Bainbridge ed., forthcoming
2012); and the examples that are the subject of the CSRC administrative punishment
decisions (xingzheng chufa juedingshu) posted continually on that agency's website,
available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/index.htm?channel=3300/3313 (last
visited May 10, 2012), including the cases analyzed in Part IV of this Article and

summarized in Appendix I.

HeinOnline -- 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 959 2012

960

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 60

At the same time, enforcement against insider trading in
China-certainly given the amount of illegal activity commonly assumed and occasionally reported-has been anemic. 9 The reasons for
this are well-known and include: regulatory resource constraints (investigatory and enforcement); low levels of investigatory
sophistication and deficient technical means; difficulties in detecting
insider trading contemporaneously and then obtaining evidence ex
post;'0 the regulator's inability to act as a civil action plaintiff (and
thus extract information and/or settlements from market participants); constraints on the private civil action applicable across
China's corporate law and securities law regimes; the uneven competence, autonomy and independence of China's judiciary; and-of
overwhelming importance in the Chinese context-the political and
economic power of some of the most flagrant violators, whether individuals or institutions. Some analysts even point to a conflict in the
role of China's securities regulator itself, the CSRC: tasked on one
side with the protection of investors and market transparency, and
on the other side ". . . provid [ing] the [state-owned enterprises] with

preferential access to the financial resources of the capital market for
the best interests of the government; . . ."11 Whatever the constellation of reasons for it, lackluster enforcement will fuel a familiar
vicious circle: obstacles to robust enforcement can ensure that the
costs of insider trading are minimal or non-existent, especially when
compared to the benefits on offer, which in turn only encourages further insider trading in the Chinese markets.
B.

Legal and Regulatory Norms

The legal and regulatory norms governing
developed quickly in the PRC, and concurrent
even before-the formal, legal, establishment
capital markets and stock exchanges. With the

insider trading have
with-or sometimes
of China's domestic
formation of China's

9. One author reviewing the period between 2002 and the end of 2006, or the
period prior to the distribution of what this Article calls the "Insider Trading Guidance Provisions," notes the application of administrative sanctions by the CSRC in
196 cases of securities fraud, only one of which (in 2004) related to insider trading.
See Han, supra note 8, at 57. See also Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt,
Reputational Sanctions in China's Securities Market, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 929, 942
(for 2001-2006: "the number of [CSRC] sanctions seems rather modest given the ubiquity and severity of the problems with .

.

. insider trading .

.

. in China's stock

markets.").
10. See, e.g., the May 2007 statement by a CSRC No. I Investigation Department
official: "With respect to the investigation of insider trading, [we] face two issues: difficulties in obtaining evidence and recognition . . ." Ling et al., supra note 8, at 66.
11. Han, supra note 8, at 58 (pointing to the "quota" system discontinued more
than a decade ago, and the continued presence of poorly-performing state-owned enterprises listed on China's domestic capital markets). I do not concur with Han Shen's
notion of a conflicted or even corrupt CSRC, a personal view informed by almost
twenty years of interaction with the CSRC and its officers.
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first post-1949 stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen, the governments of Shanghai and Shenzhen on November 27, 1990 and May
15, 1991 respectively, 12 each promulgated municipal-level "measures" (banfa) that explicitly prohibited "insider trading" (neimu
jiaoyi).'3 In April 1993, the State Council Securities Commission
(SCSC)-the PRC State Council department governing the then
newly-established CSRC1 4-promulgated the first national-level regulations concerning securities issuance and trading, the 1993
Provisional Regulations on the Administration of Stock Issuance and
Trading (SCSC Issuance and Trading Regulations)15 which also explicitly prohibited "insider trading." That prohibition was echoed in
the September 1993 Provisional Measures on Prohibiting Securities
Fraud Behavior issued by the SCSC (SCSC Securities Fraud Measures),16 which set forth the first detailed treatment of insider
trading in the history of China. In October of 1997, the PRC national
legislature amended the PRC Criminal Law' 7 to include the crime of
"insider trading" (at Article 180), but without any further elaboration
on the elements of this new crime (other than heightened mens reatype requirements which work across the Criminal Law).
Only in 1999, with passage of China's first post-1949 Securities
Law,18 was insider trading extensively described and prohibited in a
non-criminal "law" (as contrasted with an administrative regulation),
12. Shanghaishi Zhengquan Jiaoyi Guanli Banfa [Shanghai Municipal Measures
on the Administration of Securities Trading] (promulgated by the Shanghai Mun.
People's Gov't., Nov. 27, 1990), art. 39, available at http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/
newlaw2002/sl/slc.asp?db=lar&gid=16778536; and Shenzhenshi Gupiao Faxing YU
Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Banfa [Shenzhen Municipal Interim Measures on the Administration of Stock Issuance and Trading] (approved by the People's Bank of China, Apr.
27, 1990, promulgated by the Guangdong Provincial People's Gov't., May 15, 1991,
effective June 15, 1991), art. 43, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.
aspx?lib=law&ID=591.
13. The term "insider trading" (neimujiaoyi)first entered China's legal and regulatory lexicon in the October 1990 Zhengquan Gongsi Guanli Zanxing Banfa
[Provisional Measures on the Administration of Securities Companies] (promulgated
by the People's Bank of China, Oct. 12, 1990), available at http://vip.chinalawinfo.
comi/newlaw2002/slk/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=33589.
14. In April of 1998, the SCSC was disbanded, and the CSRC elevated to a regulatory department at the rank of a state ministry.
15. Gupiao Faxing YU Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations on
the Administration of Stock Issuance and Trading] (promulgated by the St. Council,
Apr. 22, 1993), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&
ID=1334.
16. Jinzhi Zhengquan Qizha Xingwei Zanxing Banfa [Provisional Measures on
Prohibiting Securities Fraud Behavior] (approved by the St. Council, Aug. 15, 1993,
promulgated by the SCSC, Sept. 9, 1993), available at http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/
newlaw2002/sle/sic.asp?db=chl&gid=6360.
17. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa [PRC Criminal Law] (promulgated by
the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997, as amended Feb. 25,
2011), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&ID=354.
18. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa [PRC Securities Law] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, effective July 1, 1999), availableat
http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&ID=1084.
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a formulation largely carried over into the extensively-revised Securities Law passed in late 2005 and effective on January 1, 2006 (2006
PRC Securities Law).' 9
Finally, on March 3, 2007, the CSRC conceived an internal "guidance document" (zhidaoxing wenjian) for the 2006 PRC Securities
Law statutory prohibition on insider trading, the (Provisional) Guide
for the Recognition and Confirmation of Insider Trading Behavior in
the Securities Markets (Insider Trading Guidance Provisions). 20 The
Insider Trading Guidance Provisions by their own terms do not constitute publicly-issued or gazetted law or regulations, departmental
rules, or any norms of which market participants have any formal
notice; instead, they are self-proclaimed internal guidance for staff of
the CSRC, subordinate securities regulatory bodies, and the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges regarding the application of law and the
implementation of administrative enforcement. As this will become
important for the legal analysis following, it should be emphasized
that the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions are not "public" in
the way that concept is understood as a legal term of art in China.
While the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions appear to be "available," for instance on a widely-used subscriber on-line collection of
Chinese laws and regulations, 2 1 they are not "public" in the legal
sense because they are not issued by the CSRC to the public (but
instead to CSRC staff, local securities regulatory bodies, and the two
Chinese exchanges), are not posted on the CSRC website, and have
never been included in any form of legislative or regulatory gazette.

II.

THE CHINESE INSIDER TRADING REGIME(S)

China's insider trading regulatory regime, as applied, is plagued
by a very serious conflict between the system (i) as it exists in formal
law, on one hand, and (ii) as articulated and increasingly enforced via
agency action of dubious legality, on the other. As I demonstrate in
19. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa [PRC Securities Law] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&ID=4693.
20. Attached to Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Guanyu Yinfa
"Zhengquan Shichang Caozong Xingwei Rending Zhiyin (Shixing)" Ji "Zhengquan
Shichang Neimu Jiaoyi Xingwei Rending Zhiyin (Shixing)" De Tongzhi [Notice of the
China Securities Regulatory Commission Regarding the Printing and Distribution of
the "(Provisional) Guide for the Recognition and Confirmation of Manipulative Behavior in the Securities Markets" and the "(Provisional) Guide for the Recognition and
Confirmation of Insider Trading Behavior in the Securities Markets"] (not promulgated but distributed internally by the CSRC, Mar. 27, 2007), available at http://vip.
chinalawinfo.com/NewLaw2002/SLC/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=144622 [the covering Notice
hereinafter, Securities Trading Manipulation and Insider Trading Guidance Notice;
the attached (Provisional) Guide for the Recognition and Confirmation of Insider
Trading Behavior in the Securities Markets hereinafter, the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions].
21. E.g., ChinaLawInfo (http://www.chinalawinfo.com).
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this Article, the latter non-law-based structure cuts the insider trading breach out of a whole new cloth and authorizes enforcement of
insider trading liability against mere possessors of non-public, material, information who happen to trade securities during a
subsequently-determined price sensitive period.
Before I analyze and explain the very serious dysfunction between the statutory or "legal" regime, on one side, and the
administrative enforcement structure, on another, it may be helpful
to keep in mind two trading situations where insider trading liability
might be at issue, depending upon how an insider trading regime is
crafted: (i) "tippee" trading, and (ii) where an individual who acts as
the financial advisor to an acquiring company trades in the stock of a
listed target-defined here in short form as "tippees" and "M&A advisors" respectively. As will be shown below, in each case (and other
than tippees or M&A advisors who misappropriate inside information), there is no basis for the assertion of insider trading liability
against such persons trading on non-public, material, information
under the 2006 PRC Securities Law. The only basis for enforcement
or prosecution against such persons lies in what I argue are the legally defective 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions. 22
A.

The 2006 Statutory Scheme

The 2006 PRC Securities Law addresses insider trading in eight
articles of the statute. 23 Most fundamentally, Article 73 states:
Article 73. It is prohibited for those with knowledge of securities trading [related] inside information or those who have
illegally procured inside information to use inside information in undertaking securities trading activities.
This key article prohibits (i) those "with knowledge of securities trading related] inside information" and (ii) those "who have illegally
procured inside information," from using inside information to engage in securities trading activities. For ease of reference, I will refer
to these two distinct bases for insider trading liability as "PWKII" (for
persons with knowledge of securities trading related inside information) and "misappropriation" respectively.
22. See, e.g., infra Part IV, and Appendix I (in particular, the Jia Huazhang & Liu
Rong Decision (tippee liability) and the Zhang Xiaojian Decision (M&A advisor
liability)).
23. See 2006 PRC Securities Law, supra note 19, arts. 5 (basic prohibition against
insider trading), 47 (short-swing trading by insiders), 73-76 (elaborated provisions on
insider trading, analyzed here), 180 (power of the CSRC to stop trading in suspect
securities), and 202 (administrative penalties and measures). Criminal prosecution
for the established crime of insider trading (at Article 180 of the PRC Criminal Law)
is explicitly authorized at Article 231, while civil damages (and, perhaps, a private
claim in damages) are given a legal basis in the final clause of Article 76.
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1. "Persons with Knowledge of Inside Information" (PWKII)
The 2006 statute (like its 1999 predecessor) in Article 74 explicitly narrows the scope of possible defendants who may be deemed
PWKII:
Article 74. Persons with knowledge of securities trading [related] inside information include: ...
Those designated "include" (baokuo): a roster of traditional issuer,
market or regulatory insiders (via Article 74(i)-(vi)),2 4 and "other persons stipulated in regulation (gui'ding) by the State Council
Securities Regulatory Organ [i.e., the CSRC]" (via Article 74(vii)).
It is unclear whether the Chinese form of "including" (baokuo)
here means "including only" or "including without limitation." We do
know, however, that Chinese legislative drafting practice, certainly
for statutes drafted at the time of the 2006 PRC Securities Law,
which seeks to codify the understanding "including without limitation" increasingly uses the characters "baokuo dan buxianyu," a form
not employed in this instance. Accordingly, this Article 74 iteration of
"include" (baokuo) must be taken as a very strong indication that persons not included in the statutory enumeration, or not specifically
designated by the CSRC pursuant to Article 74(vii), cannot be insider
trading defendants for the PWKII prong of liability.
The specific delegation of regulatory authority to the CSRC to
designate other PWKII is drafted with some art:
Article 74.

. .

. (vii) other persons stipulated in regulation

(gui'ding)by the State Council Securities Regulatory Organ.
This should be distinguished from a similar grant of authority, again
to the CSRC, to merely "recognize and confirm" (ren'ding)other information that might constitute inside information in nearby Article
75(viii) of the 2006 PRC Securities Law.
24. These statutory PWKII are: directors, supervisory board members, and senior
managers of the issuer; five percent or more shareholders of the company and its/their
directors, supervisory board members and senior managers, and the actual controlling shareholders of the company and its/their directors, supervisory board members
and senior managers; directors, supervisory board members and senior managers of
companies controlled by the issuer; people whose executive or staff position in the company provides access to inside information; CSRC staff and others who pursuant to
their legally stipulated duties administer or regulate securities issuance and trading;
and relevant securities sponsors, underwriters, securities exchange personnel, securities registration and settlement personnel, and securities service institution
personnel. (The CSRC must have seen how badly drafted the statutory provision in
italics above was, and so very appropriately sought to adjust it in the 2007 Insider
Trading Guidance Provisions to cover: "the controlling shareholders of the issuer or
listed company, other companies controlled by the actual control party, and their directors, supervisory board members and senior management." See Insider Trading
Guidance Provisions, supra note 20, art. 6(2)(ii).)
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Article 74(vii) of the 2006 PRC Securities Law allows the CSRC
to identify-by the act of "regulating" or "stipulating in regulation"
(gui'ding)-"others"(qitaren),aside from the traditional insiders enumerated in Article 74(i)-(vi), as PWKII. 2 5 Given the predominant and
continuing Chinese focus on statutorily-enumerated insiders, this
grant of regulatory authority to the CSRC in Article 74(vii) to widen
the scope of PWKII represented in 2006 a significant nod in the (future) direction of loosening the perhaps under-inclusive list of
PWKII-related insider trading defendants. 26
In sum, the effect of Articles 73 and 74 of the 2006 PRC Securities Law is to limit the scope of PWKII insider trading defendants to
those persons or institutions enumerated in Article 74(i)-(vi), or additional persons formally designated ex ante in CSRC regulation
pursuant to Article 74(vii).2 7 For scholars familiar with U.S. insider
trading jurisprudence, this statutory regime seemingly rejects the
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur2 8 "equal access theory" expansion of
Cady, Roberts & Co., 2 9 which extended insider trading liability from
"corporate insiders" to anyone in possession of material, non-public
information. Instead, the PRC regime tracks the narrowing of insider
trading liability also seen in the United States to something closer to
the "classical" or fiduciary duty theory in Chiarella v. United
States,3 0 so that insider trading liability is limited to those in breach
of some kind of fiduciary or special relationship of trust and confidence with the trading counterparty. 3 1
2.

A "Misappropriation" Basis

In addition to the PWKII basis for insider trading described immediately above is the insider trading liability created by the second
prong of Article 73 read in conjunction with a phrase in Article 76 of
the 2006 PRC Securities Law, which provides for a separate "misappropriation" theory of insider trading for China. These provisions of
25. There was no need to grant the CSRC authority to widen the scope of defendants independently subject to the misappropriation prong because there is no defined
class of "persons who have illegally procured inside information" as there is for "persons with knowledge of inside information."
26. As is consistent with larger patterns in PRC legislative practice, designed to
allow a certain level of generality in law, while conferring significant discretion on
administrative institutions.
27. As is consistent with the earliest iterations of insider trading law in China,
which addressed only the actions of formal (status) insiders. See, e.g., SCSC Issuance
and Trading Regulations, supra note 15, art. 81, and SCSC Securities Fraud Measures, supra note 16, art. 5.
28. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
29. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
30. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
31. With the exception of the tender offer context, where the "equal access" theory
lives on in the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's 1934 Securities and Exchange Act Rule 14e-3, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1981).
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the 2006 PRC Securities Law establish the culpability of anybody
who has "illegally procured inside information" (feifa huoqu neimu
xinxi de ren). Persons who misappropriate inside information are
identified separately from, and do not have to be in the class of, the
enumerated PWKII set forth in Article 74.
Again in U.S. jurisprudential terms, this formulation is meant to
track the relatively recent (1997) innovation in United States v.
O'Hagen,3 2 which created an expanded basis of insider trading liability for traders who breach a fiduciary duty or other special
relationship with the source of the inside information-recall that per
Chiarella the special duty or relationship must be with the trading
counterparty.
For those who misappropriate inside information, therefore, to
effect a successful enforcement action the PRC government only
needs to demonstrate: (i) "illegal procurement" of information, (ii)
that such information is "inside information," (iii) use of that inside
information to trade, and (iv) trading of securities (of an issuer related in some way to the information). For this prong, there is no
need to establish that the trader is a PWKII.
3.

"Use" of Inside Information and a Legal Basis for "Tipper"
Liability

In defining what exactly the prohibited "use" (liyong) of inside
information is, the 2006 PRC Securities Law elaborates on the legal
duties of both PWKII and those who have misappropriated, duties
which again seem to track, in part, the U.S.-style, "disclose or abstain
from trading" rule: people in possession of "inside information [relevant to specific] securities trading" (zhengquan jiaoyi neimu xinxi)
are prohibited from (i) purchasing or selling that company's securities, (ii) disclosing such information, or (iii) suggesting that others
purchase or sell such securities, in each case at any time before such
inside information is publicly disclosed (gongkai).33
The third prong in the summary immediately above-"suggesting that others, etc . . ."-is the basis in Chinese law for yet

another kind of insider trading liability, what other jurisdictions call
"tipper" or "tipping" liability, or what the statutory provision describes as "suggesting that others purchase or sell such securities."
Note than an individual can be liable for insider trading under this
basis even where the defendant has not actually engaged in securities trading (but most assuredly "used" inside information by
suggesting that another person trade on it).
32. United States v. O'Hagen, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
33. 2006 PRC Securities Law, supra note 19, art. 76.
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Conversely, "tip" recipients-or "tippees"-are not subject to insider trading liability under the 2006 PRC Securities Law
formulations, at least insofar as they are not PWKII enumerated in
Article 74(i)-(vi), identified in any publicly issued CSRC regulation as
PWKII pursuant to Article 74(vii), or deemed to be guilty of misappropriation of the information under the second prong of Article 73
and Article 76.
4. No Breach of Duty or Scienter Requirement
On first blush, the statutory scheme outlined above may seem
overbroad with respect to liability for innocent traders who happen to
be a part of the enumerated class of PWKII. This concern will be
rooted in the fact that, at least in the civil and administrative enforcement sphere, there is no proxy for a requirement of scienter or
breach of duty by the defendants with respect to their illicit use of
valuable information or any duty they owe to others. This in turn
raises the very strong possibility of something like strict liability for
certain individuals who trade innocently in the relevant securities
while they happen to be in possession of inside information. 34
There is in fact no great need for a proxy for the requirement of
scienter or breach of duty by the defendants under either statutory
prong of the insider trading breach, PWKII or misappropriation. For
the PWKII basis, the strict delimitation of persons included within
the scope of PWKII under the statute or any qualifying public regulation ensures that persons captured by the statutory formulation
"should have known" that information in their possession is non-public, may be valuable, and that they should not trade on it. For the
misappropriation basis, confirmed "illegal procurement of inside information" serves fairly well as an indication of some kind of guilty
intent or breach of a legal or ethical duty to the source of the information. There is even less need for any proxy for breach of duty or
scienter in respect of the crime of "insider trading" under Article 180

34. Which has pushed good faith efforts by authoritative scholars of Chinese law
to divine something less draconian than strict liability. See, e.g., Huang, supra note 8,
at 291-92, 294-95 (citing to the 1999 PRC Securities Law equivalent of Article 74 of
the 2006 PRC Securities Law, and referring to two tests "for proving the defendant's
knowledge that the information is inside information, namely the subjective knowledge test to prove the insider 'knew,' and the objective knowledge test to prove that
the insider 'ought to have reasonably known' . . .", as well as ". . . an additional 'per-

sonal connection' test to define insiders, requiring that there must be a causal link
between the insider's position and the acquisition of information . . ." such that trading is only prohibited if PWKII "have access to the information by virtue of their
connection with the company whose securities are affected, by virtue of their office or
profession").
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of the PRC Criminal Law, because all crimes require some showing of
intentionality (interpreted as actual intent or recklessness). 3 5
Importantly for this analysis, however, the lack of need for a scienter or breach of duty requirement under the statute for civil
enforcement is only valid if the insider trading breach is constructed
in the limited way set forth under the 2006 PRC Securities Law. If
that limited architecture is widened or dismantled-as I demonstrate
it is under the CSRC's 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions analyzed here-then this failure to require breach of duty or scienter
will constitute a critical defect.3 6
5.

No Insider Trading Liability for: Tippers Who are Not
PWKII; Tippees; and M&A Advisors

From the foregoing analysis it should be clear that the statutory
structure for the assertion of insider trading liability under Chinese
law is in fact under-inclusive. For instance, individuals who are not
part of the Article 74-enumerated class of PWKII and who trade on
statutorily-defined inside information, even tippers alluded to in Article 76 who are not PWKII (and have not engaged in
misappropriation), cannot be liable for insider trading. Likewise,
neither tippee traders nor M&A advisors defined above3 7 who are not
part of the Article 74-enumerated class of PWKII would have exposure to insider trading liability (again, unless independently guilty of
misappropriation). Why is this true? Tippees are exculpated because
Article 76 only prohibits tipping (although "tippees" would have liability if members of the Article 74-enumerated class, or their
receiving the tip constitutes "illegal procurement" of inside information). M&A advisors-again, if not guilty of misappropriation of
inside information-are also outside of the enumerated class of
PWKII listed in Article 74, as they are not employed at the company
which issues the securities traded with the benefit of inside
information.
These several examples of behaviors that are not captured by the
statutory prohibition against insider trading are to be kept in mind,
because in Part II.B.2 below I show how the same behaviors are covered by the new architecture and expanded substantive scope of the
CSRC's 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions.

35.
subject
15.
36.
37.

PRC Criminal Law, supra note 17, art. 14. Merely negligent behavior is only
to criminal prosecution when the PRC Criminal Law explicitly says so. Id. art.
See infra Part II.B.1.
See supra note 22, and text.
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B. Agency Designation of "Insiders"and a Parallel(and
Conflicting) Enforcement Regime
As noted above, the CSRC evidently created the 2007 Insider
Trading Guidance Provisions in response to the invitation in Article
74(vii) of the 2006 PRC Securities Law. I argue here that the job was
botched very badly, with the CSRC making non-public, non-regulatory, norms of doubtful legality that nonetheless far exceed the
statutory rule-making invitation. The Insider Trading Guidance Provisions do widen very significantly the defined scope of PWKII under
Article 74, but then go many steps further to actually recast insider
trading in toto and create new and additional bases for insider trading liability in China, far beyond that ever contemplated in China's
2006 Securities Law. The result, in U.S. jurisprudential terms, is
non-public "guidance"-not law or administrative regulation-of very
uncertain enforceability that makes for an extremely robust Texas
Gulf Sulphur-type "equal access" theory of liability capturing just
about anyone trading while in possession of material, non-public,
information.
1. Insider Trading Radically Reconfigured
How do the CSRC's Insider Trading Guidance Provisions accomplish this wholesale restructuring of PRC insider trading law? Article
12 of the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions (under a Section IV
entitled "The Recognition and Confirmation (ren'ding) of Insider
Trading Behavior") ignores entirely the statutory scheme of the 2006
PRC Securities Law and sets forth a brand new architecture establishing the elements of insider trading, as follows (with new or newlydefined terms italicized):
Article 12. Securities trading activity that conforms to the
following conditions shall constitute insider trading: (1) the
person undertaking the behavior is an insider; (2) the information involved is inside information; and (3) the subject
person buys or sells related securities during the price sensitive period of the inside information, or suggests that other
persons buy or sell related securities, or [publicly] reveals
38
the [inside] information.
This formulation is at substantial variance with, and goes far beyond, the insider trading regime as it is defined in Articles 73-76 of
the 2006 PRC Securities Law described above. Most critically, Article
12 of the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions creates a new defined
38. Each of "insider," "inside information," and "price sensitive period" are defined
under the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, only one of which ("inside information") is defined under the statute. The expanded definition of PWKII is folded into
the new defined term "insider."
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term-"insider" (neimuren)-whichterm does not appear in the 2006
PRC Securities Law.3 9 The 2006 PRC Securities Law never addresses
the liability of "insiders." Instead, it only speaks to the culpability of
three actors: PWKII, those who have misappropriated inside information, and either of the foregoing who are also tippers of inside
information.
The Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, only permitted by Article 74(vii) of the 2006 PRC Securities Law to elaborate in regulation
additional members of the class of persons included in the statutory
category of PWKII, do exactly the opposite: they absorb the 2006 PRC
Securities Law Article 74(i)-(vi) statutory list of PWKII into the Guidance Provisions-created category of "insiders." That statutorilyungrounded definition of "insider" is then further expanded in the Insider Trading Guidance ProvisionS4 0 to include:
* The securities issuer, or listed company (as PWKII)
* The controlling shareholder of the issuer or listed company,
companies controlled by the actual control party of the issuer
or listed company, and their respective directors, supervisory
board members and senior management (as PWKII)
* Any party involved in a listed company's merger, acquisition
or reorganization and their relevant personnel (as PWKII)
* Persons who gain inside information in the performance of
their work (as PWKII)
* The partners and spouses of those natural persons included
in Article 74(i)-(vi) of the 2006 PRC Securities Law (i.e., statutorily-defined PWKII)
* The parents or children or other relatives of any natural persons included in the above categories who come into
possession of inside information
* Those who employ illegal methods such as trickery, coaxing,
eavesdropping, monitoring, secret trading, etc. to gain inside
information.
* Those who gain inside information through other channels.
Another part of the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions stipulates
that such "insiders" may be legal persons (corporate entities) as well
as natural persons.4 1
Perhaps most egregiously expansive in the non-statutory, nonregulatory formulation of "insider" is the last bullet above, which
makes an "insider" anyone "who gains inside information through
other channels." This is tantamount to declaring that trading while
39. Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, supra note 20, arts. 5 and 6.
40. Id. arts. 6(2)-(5).
41. Id. art. 5.
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simply in possession of inside information (and during a price sensitive period) is a basis for insider trading liability in the PRC.
There is much else besides in the 2007 Guidance Provisions that
is new, and not based in, or directly contrary to, the statute. 4 2 The
foregoing simple recitation of the Guidance Provisions' Article 12 architecture and the Chinese law neologism of "insiders" should suffice
to make clear that the CSRC internal guidance explodes the bounds
of the 2006 PRC Securities Law. Whereas under the 2006 Securities
Law only a narrowly-defined class of PWKII or those engaged in misappropriation of inside information (acting directly or as tippers)
could be liable for specifically-defined illegal behavior, under the
2007 CSRC Guidance Provisions any person simply in possession of
information (and thus an "insider" under the 2007 Provisions) which
is determined to be "inside information" who "purchases or sells relevant securities, or suggests that another purchase or sell such
securities, or communicates such inside information" during a "price
sensitive period"4 3 will be liable for insider trading. 4 4 The result is
strict liability under the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions for anyone trading in securities, or simply tipping, when deemed to be in
possession of inside information and during a price sensitive period.
In fairness, the liability conjured is not absolutely strict as the
same 2007 Guidance Provisions introduce a scienter-like requirement, something which I argue above is not necessary for the
narrower statutory regime focusing on status insiders and those who
misappropriate. 4 5 The Guidance Provisions require a determination
as to "whether or not [the defendant] knew or was informed of (zhicai) inside information"-but it does so only for (i) "the parents or
children or other relatives of any natural persons" included in the
expanded scope of PWKII in the 2007 Guidance Provisions, 4 6 and (ii)
"those who employ illegal methods such as trickery, coaxing, eavesdropping, monitoring, secret trading, etc. to gain inside information;"
and "those who gain inside information through other channels."4 7
42. See Howson, supra note 8, at 23-25 (describing the altered definition of inside
information and the new concept of the "price sensitive period").
43. The "price sensitive period" is also a new concept introduced by the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions which makes only less certain when information is
no longer "material" or "inside information."
44. It should be noted that the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, at Article 19,
provide diverse bases for exculpation, ranging from blanket exceptions (e.g., stock
buy-backs or transactions pursuant to triggered mandatory offers) to knowledge defenses, and even the broad discretion of the CSRC.
45. See supra notes 34-36, and text.
46. Who are: the securities issuer, or listed company; the controlling shareholder
of the issuer or listed company, companies controlled by the actual control party of the
issuer or listed company, and their respective directors, supervisory board members
and senior management; any party involved in a listed company's merger, acquisition
or reorganization and their relevant personnel; and persons who gain inside information in the performance of their work.
47. Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, supra note 20, art. 14(2).
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This will be cold comfort for the huge class of other potential defendants, for at the same time the 2007 Guidance Provisions make insider
trading liability only stricter for (i) the PWKII originally listed in the
2006 Securities Law at Article 74(i)-(vi) and (ii) the expanded scope of
such persons absorbed into PWKII from the Guidance Provisions.
This reverses the burden of proof for all such defendants so that they
will be liable for insider trading during the price sensitive period unless "they have sufficient evidence to demonstrate that they did not
know or were not informed of inside information."4 8
To be absolutely clear, the issue specifically addressed here is not
that the CSRC has broadened the scope of PWKII, something that
the agency was perfectly entitled to do in conformity with the PRC
legal and administrative law system. Instead, the problem is that the
CSRC has created a whole new class of defendants outside of the only
actors addressed in the Securities Law-PWKII and those who misappropriate (acting directly or as tippers)-called "insiders," who can
now be exposed to serious liability if they trade during a price sensitive period with respect to any securities (i.e., not the securities of the
company relevant to their status), and with a new burden of proof
which almost assures their guilt-unless they can prove a negative:
that they did not know or were not informed of the inside
information.
2.

Newly-created, "Guidance"-based, Insider Trading Liability
for: "Tippers" Who are Not PWKIIs; "Tippees"; and
M&A Advisors

In Part IIA.5, I have shown how none of the following constitutes behavior that is culpable under the 2006 PRC Securities Law:
(i) tipping by persons not PWKIIs or misappropriaters, (ii) tippee
trading, and (iii) M&A advisor trading.
Yet all of these same behaviors are culpable under the vastly expanded reach of the 2007 CSRC Insider Trading Guidance
Provisions. Thus, tippers who have not misappropriated inside information and who are not within the statute's enumerated class of
PWKIIs would still be liable for insider trading if they purchase or
sell securities during the price sensitive period. Similarly, tippee
traders who have not engaged in misappropriation of inside information but who trade during the price sensitive period would be liable
for insider trading. M&A advisors consulting for an acquirer and
trading in the shares of a target company during a price sensitive
period would also be liable for insider trading. In each case, there is
newly-crafted insider trading liability for securities traders under the
48. Id. art. 14(1).
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CSRC Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, liability for which there
is no basis whatsoever in the 2006 PRC Securities Law.
As discussed in more detail below, the problem identified only
becomes worse when we confront the fact that the CSRC (and likely
the People's Procuratorate in the criminal sphere) is actually enforcing China's insider trading prohibitions in precisely this way, and
therefore without any grounding in the nation's 2006 Securities Law
or any other "legal" norm.
III.

LEGAL AND REGULATORY INFIRMITY OF THE INSIDER TRADING
GUIDANCE PROVISIONS

The CSRC 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions are illegal
and should be unenforceable, for two reasons:
First, the CSRC has not actually promulgated legislative provisions, administrative regulations, departmental rules, administrative measures,4 9 or indeed any species of public rule-making under
the authority granted to it in Article 74(vii) of the 2006 PRC Securities Law with the characters "gui'ding," translated here as "to
regulate" or "to stipulate in regulation." Instead, in 2007 the CSRC
only distributed, internally and not publicly, the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions which are mere "guidance" (zhiyin) or a so-called
"guidance document" (zhidaoxing wenjian) and which declare, by
their own terms, that they function to "recognize and confirm"
(ren'ding)-not"stipulate in regulation" (gui'ding)-theenforcement
of legal norms for insider trading.
Second, the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions are ultra
vires because (i) the Guidance Provisions address far more than simply "other" PWKII, the limited object of the 2006 PRC Securities Law
Article 74(vii) statutory authorization; and (ii) the insider trading
breach described in the totality of the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions departs completely from, and vastly expands, the insider
trading prohibition set forth in the 2006 PRC Securities Law.
A.

Regulatory and Administrative Law Infirmity
1. The Verb "to Regulate" or "to Stipulate in Regulation"
(gui'ding)as used in the 2006 PRC Securities Law

If my argument that the 2007 CSRC Insider Trading Guidance
Provisions do not conform to the statutory command of the 2006 PRC
Securities Law is to be deemed valid, a first critical question is the
precise meaning of the authorization for the CSRC "to regulate" or "to
stipulate in regulation" (gui'ding) additional PWKII under Article
74(vii) of the 2006 PRC Securities Law-especially when contrasted
49. All English language translations of Chinese language terms of art. See infra
notes 53-66, and text.
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with the adjacent Article 75(viii) allowance for the CSRC to merely
"recognize and confirm" (ren'ding) important information having a
significant effect on securities prices as part of the definition of "inside information."
Inside the four corners of the 2006 PRC Securities Law, there is a
hierarchy of contemplated regulatory actions, by the CSRC and other
departments, as follows: 5 0
*
*
*
*

recognize and confirm (ren'ding)
formulate (zhiding)
regulate, or stipulate in regulation (gui'ding)
stipulate in law (fa'ding).

Below I address this hierarchy slightly out of order, to situate the
meaning of the verb command "to regulate" or "to stipulate in regulation" (gui'ding) as it appears in Article 74(vii) of the 2006 PRC
Securities Law, and to determine what kind of resultant administrative law action is required and sufficient for the verb command.
a.

"Recognize and Confirm"; "Formulate"; and "Stipulate
in Law"

The Chinese characters for the verb form "to recognize and confirm" (ren'ding)appear only a few times in the 2006 PRC Securities
Law outside of the Article 75(viii) provision allowing definition of important information having a significant effect on securities prices.
Article 2 uses that character set in referring to other instruments
"recognized and confirmed" by the State Council (and not the CSRC)
"in accordance with law" (yifa) as securities covered by the Securities
Law. Likewise, Article 170 provides that standards and administrative measures for the qualification of securities industry service firms
are to be "recognized and confirmed." It is not clear from the face of
the 2006 PRC Securities Law if the act of "recognizing and confirming" places a lesser burden on the regulator and the nature of the
resulting authorized regulation as compared with "regulate" or "stipulate in regulation" (gui'ding) and "stipulate in law" (fa'ding)
analyzed below; indeed, the modifying phrase "in accordance with
law" (yifa) in Article 2 might indicate just the opposite, and that the
regulator's burden of "recognizing and confirming" is equivalent to
that of "regulating" or "stipulating in regulation" (gui'ding).Nonetheless, the lack of the Chinese character "gui" in the compound for
"recognize and confirm" (ren'ding), strongly indicates for Chinese
readers something less than stipulation in formal regulation or law.
50. The CSRC is permitted many other actions in the 2006 PRC Securities Law,
including "rendering administrative punishments," "making decisions," "approving,"
"designating," "making orders," etc. However, only the verb forms which implicate
some kind of enforceable norm-making activity are analyzed here.
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In addition, the CSRC is tasked with "formulating" (zhiding)different norms at five places in the 2006 PRC Securities Law. At
Article 149, the character set is used to describe what the CSRC will
do with respect to "specific measures" (juti banfa) for instruction of
audit or asset appraisal of securities companies. Article 169 instructs
the CSRC to formulate "administrative measures" (guanlibanfa) for
the examination and approval of securities industry service firms. Article 170 calls for CSRC formulation of the "recognition and
confirmation" (ren'ding)of "qualification standards" and "administrative measures" (guanli banfa) for securities industry service firms.
Finally, Articles 179(i), 179(iv) and 184 allude to instances where the
CSRC generally will formulate: "departmental rules" and "rules"
(guizhang,guize) for supervision of the securities markets; qualification standards and practice standards for securities professionals;
and "departmental rules" and "rules" (guizhang,guize)-in each case
"in accordance with law."5 1 While Chinese readers will recognize the
verb "to formulate" (zhiding) as a looser way of saying "to stipulate,"
it is noteworthy that in each case this verb form is associated with a
norm-product that includes "departmental rules" or "rules"
(guizhang,guize), public standards or qualifications, and "measures"
(banfa) (a type of enactment with a specific meaning in the Chinese
administrative law scheme). 52
The only character set apparently more onerous than "regulate"
or "stipulate in regulation" (gui'ding)appearing in the 2006 PRC Securities Law is the verb form that should be translated as "stipulated
in law" (fa'ding).This formulation appears in Article 57 (issuers must
conform to conditions for debt issuances stipulated in law), Article 74
(people engaged in administration of securities issuance, or trading),
and Article 128 (conditions and procedures for review of securities
firm establishments). In addition, Article 139 has the single instance
of the phrase that "fa'ding"is a contraction of, "fali gui'ding de," also
meaning "as stipulated in law" (alluding to other situations regarding
the handling of customer securities accounts). This character grouping sets the highest bar, mandating stipulations contained in law and
not a lesser form of legal or regulatory enactment.
b.

"To Regulate" or "To Stipulate in Regulation"

The Chinese characters "gui'ding"-usedas a verb or embedded
in an adjectival phrase-appear in at least forty-five articles in the
51. The same verb "to formulate" (zhiding) is also used in connection with the
stock exchanges' obligation to formulate articles of association, listing rules, trading
and settlement rules, trading powers of attorney, and the settlement and clearing
institution's obligation to formulate business rules.
52. See infra note 57, and text.
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2006 PRC Securities Law.5 3 A single provision of the statute sets
forth a slight variation on the verb form, instructing the CSRC to
"make regulation" (zuochu gui'ding) regarding the business activities
and certain financial ratios applicable to securities firms. 5 4
The scope of norm-vehicles or anticipated products for the verb
action to "regulate" or "stipulate in regulation" (gui'ding)is limited,
and includes only: (i) the Securities Law itself (ben fa) or another
statute (fa) like the 2006 PRC Company Law; (ii) law (fal&); (iii) legislative provisions (gui'ding,as a noun), a term of art translation that
includes law, administrative regulations and departmental rules; (iv)
laws and administrative regulations (falU xingzheng fagui and fal!
xingzheng gui'ding); and (v) administrative measures (guanli banfa)

or specific (administrative) measures (juti banfa).55 Other than in
three unrelated articles which address rule-making by China's stock
exchanges,56 never in the 2006 PRC Securities Law is there an association between the act "to regulate" or "to stipulate in regulation"
(gui'ding), on one hand, and resulting identified legal or regulatory
norms, on the other, via anything other than specific statute, laws,
legislative provisions, laws and administrative regulations, administrative measures or specific (administrative) measures. Indeed, the
CSRC is never permitted in the statute to "regulate" or "stipulate in
regulation" (gui'ding)departmental rules (guizhang)or rules (guize),

which are the exclusive product of the verb form "to formulate"
(zhiding).

53. See, e.g., 2006 PRC Securities Law, supra note 19, arts. 2 (items stipulated in
other "laws and administrative regulations" (fali xingzheng fagui), the State Council
to stipulate "administrative measures" (xingzheng banfa)); 10 (conformity with conditions stipulated in "laws, administrative laws and regulations"); 11 (other securities
stipulated in "laws, administrative laws and regulations," stipulated qualifications
and administrative measures for sponsors); 66 (other matters to be included in "Major
Events" periodic reporting); 71 (mandatory public disclosure); 87 (reports and announcements stipulated in the 2006 PRC Securities Law itself); 101 (specific
measures for the takeover of listed companies); 124 (requirements for establishment
of securities firms); 133 (persons prohibited from senior posts at securities firms); 162
(settlement risk fund measures and funding); 179 (other powers for the CSRC); 229
(listing conditions); and 239 (specific measures for purchase and trading of domestic
securities in foreign exchange), etc.
54. Id. art. 130.
55. See, e.g., id. arts. 2, 5, 6, 10, 11, 24, 49, 71, 87, 90, 101, 108, 116, 123, 133, 139,
156, 163, 172, 179, 208, 229, and 239.
56. See id. arts. 52(viii), 55(v), and 58(vii) which reference-exclusively-stock exchange listing rules (shangshiguize) or just exchange rules (fiaoyisuo guize) as the
result of the verb action "to regulate" or "to stipulate" (gui'ding).The characters "guize" which can be translated as "rules," and which are referenced several times in the
statute independently of the act of regulation or stipulation in regulation (gui'ding),
seem associated in the Chinese discourse with rules issued by self-regulating bodies
or associations, and something less than legal (and perhaps regulatory) norms, including "departmental rules." See also id. art. 179, where the CSRC is obligated to
"formulate (zhiding) securities market administration rules (guizhang,guize) in accordance with law . . ."
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c. The Meaning of the Verb Form "To Regulate" or "To
Stipulate in Regulation" (gui'ding)under Article
74(vii) of the 2006 PRC Securities Law
Said another way, the uniform internal architecture of the 2006
PRC Securities Law indicates that the statutory authorization directing the CSRC "to regulate" or "to stipulate in regulation"
(gui'ding)in Article 74(vii) can only be implemented by something
which constitutes laws, legislative provisions, laws and administrative regulations, administrative measures or specific (administrative)
measures.5 7 Even where the less onerous verb form "to formulate"
(zhiding)is used at Articles 179(i), 179(iv) and 184, the CSRC is explicitly charged with formulating norms subordinate to laws,
legislative provisions, laws and administrative regulations, administrative measures or specific (administrative) measures"departmental rules" and "rules" (guizhang,guize) and public standards or qualifications-"publicly" and "in accordance with law."
2.

The 2006 PRC Securities Law Requirement that the CSRC
Act "Publicly"

Finally with regard to the internal mandates of the 2006 PRC
Securities Law itself, Article 184 states very clearly that "[the CSRC]
in formulating departmental rules and rules (guizhang,guize) and its
supervisory administration work system shall [do so] publicly
(yingdang gongkai)."5 8 This constitutes a clear legal requirement
that regulatory and enforcement norms and action by the CSRC be
accomplished "publicly" and not internally as was the case with the
2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions.5 9
3.

The PRC Law on Legislation

The 2000 PRC Law on Legislation (Law on Legislation),6 0 passed
six years before the 2006 PRC Securities Law, strongly supports the
present analysis insofar as it specifies the character and form of the
57. "Measures" (banfa) are a hold-over appellation for administrative regulation
from the pre-reform and legal construction era. Another similar appellation still commonly in use is "tiaoli" often translated as "regulations." In 1956, Mao Zedong
personally authorized the use of these documents (including articles (zhangcheng),
regulations (tiaoli), and measures (banfa)) to work in the service of application of
"law" or formal legal norms. See Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42
Am. J. Comp. L. 711, 722-23 (1994).
58. The same Chinese characters as are used to describe the obligation of all administrative agencies with respect to their administrative rule-making and
enforcement functions in the Administration According to Law Outline, supra note 4,
at para. 5(iii).
59. As noted infra notes 80-82, and text, the PRC Law on Administrative Punishments also requires that administrative enforcement be undertaken pursuant to
publicly-promulgated administrative law norms.
60. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa [PRC Law on Legislation] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong. and effective Mar. 15, 2000,
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required norms that must issue from the verb action "to regulate" or
"to stipulate in regulation" (gui'ding)-laws,legislative provisions,
laws and administrative regulations, administrative measures or
specific (administrative) measures.
Article 9 of the Law on Legislation authorizes delegation by
China's national legislature, the National People's Congress (NPC),
or the NPC Standing Committee to the State Council and its departments the power to formulate (zhiding)6 1 "administrative
regulations" (xingzheng fagui), the same Chinese character set that is
often the result of the verb "to regulate" or "to stipulate in regulation"
(gui'ding)in the 2006 PRC Securities Law. Importantly, that delegation is only effective when the NPC or its Standing Committee have
not yet passed "law" on the various areas within its/their legislative
competence (listed in Article 8 of the Law on Legislation). Articles 5662 of the Law on Legislation address such "administrative regulations." These statutory provisions make clear that these are norms
conceived, discussed, and issued only by the State Council of the
PRC, and not by any subordinate ministry, department or commission. Most importantly for the present discussion, such
administrative regulations must be signed by the Premier, "publicly
promulgated" (gongbu) in a State Council order, and then published
in the State Council gazette.6 2
Articles 71-77 of the Law on Legislation address yet another genus of administrative norm, which are commonly translated as
"departmental rules" (guizhang). These departmental rules are formulated by the State Council's subordinate departments (including
ministries), commissions (including the CSRC), the People's Bank of
China (China's central bank), the State Audit Commission, and
subordinate organs with administrative competence, and must be "in
accordance with law, and State Council administrative regulations
(xingzheng fagui), decisions (jueding), and orders (mingling)." Each of
the State Council's "subordinate departments, commissions, the People's Bank of China, the State Audit Commission and subordinate
organs with administrative competence" are referred to in the Law on
Legislation under the global term "departments" (bumen).6 3 Importantly, the Law on Legislation mandates that any "rules" formulated
by such "departments" must be formulated in accordance with law,
and must be "publicly promulgated" (gongbu) and published. 6 4
effective July 1, 2000), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=
law&ID=386.
61. This is the same verb form noted above that appears in the 2006 PRC Securities Law, see supra note 51, and text, and in the PRC Law on Legislation is used as a
general verb to formulate various kinds of norms, including "law" (falii).
62. PRC Law on Legislation, supra note 60, arts. 61 and 62.
63. Id. art. 71.
64. Id. arts. 76 and 77.
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Pursuant to the terms of the Law on Legislation then 65 -which
makes no mention of "guidance" (zhiyin) or "guidance documents"
(zhidaoxing wenjian) as a species of "administrative regulation"
(xingzheng fagui) or any other kind of norm-the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions qualify neither as (i) "administrative
regulations" (xingzheng fagui), nor as (ii) "departmental rules"
(guizhangor bumen guizhang). They are not the former, because they
are not formulated and issued by the State Council or made public
(nor are they issued in the absence of legal stipulations on the same
subject). They are not the latter because they are not publicly issued
or published. As noted above, the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions are merely internal guidance for the CSRC in enforcement
against insider trading, and have never been publicly promulgated
and are not published on the CSRC website. In addition, they are
norms which far exceed the bounds of the 2006 PRC Securities Law,
and are thus anything but norms "formulated in accordance with
law."
4.

Is the CSRC's 2007 Guidance a "Normative Document"
(guifanxing wenjian)?

Some may understand the CSRC's 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions as what the Chinese legal and governance system
calls a "normative document" (guifanxing wenjian), i.e., long-standing Chinese Communist Party-led state governance norms not
formally recognized in the Law on Legislation. In the PRC, the term
has historically been used for the many non-legal norms enforced in
fact, including everything from line ministry or local People's Congress norms to specifically-tailored bureaucratic communications and
institutional or personal approvals.6 6 Even after the promulgation of
the Law on Legislation, which does not refer to such norms, the term
is still used in government and departmental pronouncements-like
the State Council's 2004 Administration According to Law Outline6 7
and 2010 Rule of Law Government Opinion 6 8-in concrete acknowledgement of the fact that many such non-legal, non-regulatory,
65. Promulgated more than a decade before the PRC Law on Legislation, the PRC
Administrative Litigation Law, infra note 72, in describing the kinds of administrative acts or norms that can and cannot be subject to challenge, also refers to
"administrative regulations" (xingzheng fagui) and "departmental rules" (guizhang)
with the same terminology (Articles 12(2) and 53). In addition, the PRC Administrative Litigation Law refers to "decisions" (jueding) and "orders" (mingling) "formulated
and announced by administrative organs with universal binding force" (Article 12(2)).
There is no mention in the PRC Administrative Litigation Law of a norm called "guidance" (zhiyin) or "guidance documents" (zhidaoxing wenjian) as a species of
"administrative regulation" or "departmental rules."
66. See Keller, supra note 57, at 722-23.
67. See, e.g., Administration According to Law Outline, supra note 4, paras. 3(ii)
and 14.
68. See, e.g., Rule of Law Government Opinion, supra note 6, paras. 8-10.
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norms continue to exist and continue to be applied by various state
actors and Communist Party officials.
All of the above notwithstanding, the CSRC's 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions are still defective and unenforceable, even if
understood as a "normative document." This is because: (i) the 2006
PRC Securities Law does not authorize issuance of such normative
documents for the further enumeration of PWKII, but instead calls
for the issuance of legislative provisions, administrative regulations,
or administrative measures; (ii) the CSRC Guidance Provisions do
not comply with the basic requirements for issuance of apparently
enforceable normative documents (that they be issued publicly, and
are subject to the "file and review" (bei'an shencha) procedure);69 and
(iii) as demonstrated here, the substantive content of the Insider
Trading Guidance Provisions is ultra vires and wildly out of conformity with China's explicit statutory provisions on insider trading.
5. What are "Guidance Documents" (zhidaoxing wenjian)
Anyway?
The CSRC's 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions declare
themselves to be a "guidance document" (zhidaoxing wenjian). This
self-declaration begs the question as to what exactly such "guidance
documents" are. Most importantly in the present context, can they
qualify as legislative provisions, administrative regulations, administrative measures, or even departmental rules that are responsive to
the 2006 PRC Securities Law Article 74(vii) mandate, or as enforceable legal-regulatory norms under the Law on Legislation?
In fact, there is no reference whatsoever to such "guidance documents" in any national PRC law or administrative regulation, and
certainly not in the Law on Legislation; instead, there is only the exhortation for "administrative guidance" (xingzhengzhidao) in various
departmental rules. These exhortations are a reflection of the State
Council's allusion to the same item in its 2004 Administration According to Law Outline. 70
The only, partial, reference to the concept of administrative "guidance" comes in Article 1(4) of the Supreme People's Court's 2000
interpretation 7 ' of the 1989 Administrative Litigation Law (Adminis69. Required under the 2004 Administration According to Law Outline and the
2010 Rule of Law Government Opinion, supra notes 4 and 6.
70. See Administration According to Law Outline, supra note 4.
71. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Zhixing "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Xingzheng Susong Fa" Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi [Supreme People's Court Interpretation of Certain Issues in the Implementation of the PRC Administrative Litigation
Law] (passed by the Sup. People's Ct. Adjudication Comm. Nov. 24, 1999, promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct. Mar. 8, 2000, and effective Mar. 10, 2000), available at
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/NewLaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=chl&Gid=26982 [hereinafter Administrative Litigation Law Interpretation].
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trative Litigation Law), 72 which stipulates that "administrative
guidance acts (xingzheng zhidao xingwei) that do not possess coercive
force (qiangzhili)"are not justiciable under the Administrative Litigation Law. The negative implication of that provision is that
"administrative guidance acts" that do have coercive force are justiciable under the Administrative Litigation Law. While that notion may
be helpful for a private party wishing to challenge any CSRC enforcement pursuant to the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions
alone, it provides no help in making such "administrative guidance
acts" (which may include internal issuance of a "guidance document"
like the CSRC's 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions) qualify as
legislative provisions, administrative regulations, administrative
measures, or even departmental rules apparently required under the
2006 PRC Securities Law or the Law on Legislation.
6.

Conclusion as to Regulatory and Administrative Law
Infirmity of the Insider Trading Guidance
Provisions

The simple conclusion of the foregoing analysis is this: the CSRC,
by issuing the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, has not created a legal or regulatory norm which conforms to the statutory
authorization in Article 74(vii) of the 2006 PRC Securities Law to
"regulate" or "stipulate in regulation" (gui'ding)"other" PWKII.
First, as demonstrated above, the statutory command to the
CSRC in Article 74(vii) of the 2006 PRC Securities Law is to issue
what the Securities Law and the Law on Legislation would limit to
legislative provisions, administrative regulations, departmental rules
or administrative measures regarding the other actors who can be
identified as PWKII. Instead, the CSRC distributed internally a different species of direction called "(provisional) guidance (zhiyin) on
the recognition and confirmation (ren'ding)"of insider trading behavior;73 it self-identifies as a "guidance document" (zhidaoxingwenjian)
for use by CSRC officials only to "recognize and confirm insider trading."74 Moreover, that guidance-by its own terms-is based in, or
authorized by, a cluster of norms it is itself supposed to be: "the Securities Law, and the related provisions of other laws, administrative
regulations (xingzheng fagui) and departmental rules (guizhang)."75
How, one might ask, can a norm (called "guidance") be an "adminis72. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa [PRC Administrative
Litigation Law] (promulgated by Nat'l People's Cong. Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1,
1990), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&ID=1204.
73. Which seems more directly responsive to the 2006 PRC Securities Law Article
75(viii) invitation to "recognize and confirm" (ren'ding) price-moving inside
information.
74. Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, supra note 20, art. 4.
75. Id. art. 1.
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trative regulation" or "rule" authorized by the superior norm it is
supposed to be-"administrative regulation" or "rule"-by the terms
of the delegating law?
Second, and equally importantly, the CSRC 2007 Guidance is not
public, which under the Law on Legislation all administrative regulations (xingzheng fagui) and departmental rules (guizhang), and
under the 2006 PRC Securities Law all departmental rules and rules
(guizhang, guize), must be. Permitted to "regulate" or "stipulate in
regulation" (gui'ding) a very specific norm, in 2007 the CSRC produced something internally which is not responsive to, and does not
conform to, that authorization.
B.

The 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions are Ultra Vires

The Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, whatever their standing as administrative regulation or departmental rules, and even if
they had been issued "publicly," are ultra vires. The Provisions proclaim that they are formulated in accordance with "the Securities
Law, and the relevant provisions of other laws, administrative regulations and rules."76 This is a falsehood, and the Insider Trading
Guidance Provisions are demonstrably ultra vires on two counts:
First, the CSRC Provisions address matters far beyond the narrow grant of regulatory authority in Article 74(vii) of the 2006 PRC
Securities Law-limited to designation of "other" PWKII.
Second, they are ultra vires with respect to the entire legal understanding of insider trading under the Securities Law, because
they re-define the civil breach and eventually the crime. As demonstrated in Part II.B. above, the liability for insider trading set forth in
the CSRC's 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions departs radically and completely from the limited bases for insider trading under
the 2006 PRC Securities Law. The CSRC Insider Trading Guidance
Provisions provide for (in U.S. securities law parlance) a Texas Gulf
Sulphur theory of liability (covering anyone in possession of inside
information who trades), whereas the 2006 PRC Securities Law allows only a narrow version of (again in U.S. parlance) Cady, Roberts/
Chiarellaliability (covering only the specific actors identified in Article 74) and what obviously aspires to be O'Hagen-style
misappropriation liability.
C. A Distinction that Explains the Problem:Article 77 "Securities
Trading Manipulation" Unaffected
A short tangent regarding another 2006 PRC Securities Law
breach, similar to the insider trading prohibition, may aid in under76. Id.
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standing how and why the CSRC is in such a difficult spot with
respect to insider trading.
Article 77 of the 2006 PRC Securities Law describes the separate
breach of "securities trading manipulation." Yet there, the CSRC
would be-and indeed is 7 7-perfectly in compliance with the law in
using internal guidance for enforcement against such market manipulation. This is because Article 77(iv) provides a broad catch-all
against "other methods of securities market manipulation" without
specific required elements to make out "manipulation" (such as scienter, purchase or sale of securities, etc.), and Article 77 makes no
specific delegation of regulatory power to the CSRC or any other
agency for further elaboration or description. The statute is silent,
and the CSRC's discretion apparently unbounded.
Accordingly, the CSRC is free under the statute to proceed
against such manipulation in any way it determines, and without reference to any notified or universally applicable administrative law
norm-something I argue it cannot do with respect to insider trading.
The situation described in this Article is very different: for insider
trading there is a detailed statutory structure informing the elements
of the breach (and the scope of the prohibition), and two very limited
commands to the regulator to provide elaboration-the mandate to
"regulate" or "stipulate in regulation" "other" PWKII, and the authorization to "recognize and confirm" (ren'ding) important information
having a significant effect on securities prices. 7 8 Under the governing
statute, the CSRC simply does not have the leeway with respect to
insider trading that it has with respect to the separate breach of securities trading manipulation.
IV.

ENFORCEMENT ABUSE

Unfortunately, the significant problem identified and analyzed
here is not just a theoretical one. The CSRC is actively enforcing insider trading liability under the very wide theory promised by the
defective 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, and in situations where the 2006 PRC Securities Law does not cover the
77. Which the CSRC did at the same time it distributed internally the defective
Insider Trading Guidance Provisions in 2007. See the CSRC's Securities Trading Manipulation and Insider Trading Guidance Notice, supra note 20.
78. The analysis here might lead to the conclusion that the CSRC is also free to
determine what constitutes price-impacting information for insider trading enforcement without issuing formal regulation or rules, because Article 75(viii) of the 2006
PRC Securities Law merely requires that the CSRC "recognize and confirm"
(ren'ding)what that information is in specific circumstances. In fact, the 2007 Insider
Trading Guidance Provisions do set forth ways in which the CSRC is to "recognize
and confirm" such information in the context of an insider trading enforcement action.
Working against this forgiving conclusion is the general requirement in Articles 179
and 184 of the 2006 PRC Securities Law, noted above, that the CSRC formulate "departmental rules" or "rules" (guizhang,guize), and that they do so "publicly."
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sanctioned behavior. Authoritative PRC academic analysts note
this,79 and a glance at recent enforcement decisions posted on the
CSRC website makes this abundantly clear (summaries of the examples referred to immediately below appear in Appendix I).
The 2011 Liu Yang enforcement decision shows how liberally the
CSRC misapplies Article 74 of the 2006 PRC Securities Law, in that
the defendant is pronounced a PWKII simply because he "participated in . . [the reverse merger] related affairs." This is not what is
provided for under Article 74(iv) ("persons who are able to obtain relevant inside information concerning the company by virtue of the
position they hold in the company"), which is unavailable precisely
because the defendant comes into possession of important information about a company-the target--different from the one he is
employed at. Nor does the CSRC make any effort to base the defendant's liability in the misappropriation prong of the statute. Without
any doubt, in this case the CSRC relies upon the wider basis for insider trading liability in the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance
Provisions because it cannot make out a claim under the governing
statute.
In the 2011 Lin Shiquan enforcement action, the CSRC does not
indicate how the defendant qualifies as one of the PWKII enumerated
in Article 74 of the 2006 PRC Securities Law, stating only that he
"became" a PWKII. He is not identified as an officer or shareholder of
the controlling shareholder of the issuer, although he is identified as
the top executive of another entity which may be a shareholder of the
issuer holding more than five percent of the issuer under Article
74(ii) of the Securities Law. Nowhere in the decision does the CSRC
feel the need to articulate how this defendant qualifies as a PWKII,
or if he is guilty of misappropriation of the information, no doubt because they are relying upon the broader basis for insider trading
liability provided for in the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance
Provisions.
In the 2010 Jia Huazhang & Liu Rong decision regarding a fairly
standard husband-wife/tipper-tippee case, the CSRC simply declares
the husband/tipper to be a PWKII without tying his status to the enumerated persons under Article 74. Nor does the CSRC independently
identify him as someone who has misappropriated inside information
under Articles 73 and 76. He may be a tipper of material, non-public,
79. See Ye Lin, Neimu Xinxi De Falui Guanzhi [Insider TradingLegal Regime], in
[SECURITIEs LAw] 319 (Ye Lin, Duan Wei, Wang Shihua &
Wang Huajie eds., 2010) ("The [Insider Trading Guidance Provisions] clearly stipulate that where insider trading with respect to any exchange-issued or -listed
securities is identified, the [Insider Trading] Guidance Provisions are to be applied. If
insider trading is identified on any other State Council-approved securities exchange,
enforcement is to be implemented with reference to the [Insider Trading] Guidance
Provisions.").
ZHENGQUANFA JIAOCHENG
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information, but because he is neither a PWKII nor guilty of misappropriation, he is not subject to the tipping prohibition under Article
76. Thus, as a person who has merely come into possession of inside
information, it is unclear how he is an insider trading defendant
under the law, unless the CSRC is using the broader basis for enforcement provided for under the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance
Provisions. Second, the wife is a tippee-trader of inside information,
and again the CSRC makes no connection between her possession of
the information and any kind of misappropriation of inside information. Again, she is not an appropriate defendant under Article 76 of
the PRC 2006 Securities Law, and the only way in which the CSRC
can accomplish enforcement against her is extra-legally via the 2007
Insider Trading Guidance Provisions.
If nothing else, these readily available examples of extra-legal
administrative enforcement demonstrate clear violations of the 1996
PRC Law on Administrative Punishments, which forbids the imposition of such punishments without a statutory basis,8 0 makes invalid
administrative punishments imposed not in accordance with law, 8 '
and forbids the imposition of administrative punishment under law
other than in accordance with publicly-promulgated norms.8 2
There remains a more serious question as to whether the PRC
People's Procuratorate-China's criminal prosecutor-is also using
the all-embracing Insider Trading Guidance Provisions to establish
the elements of the crime of insider trading via Article 180 of the PRC
Criminal Law, resulting in the imprisonment and deprivation of the
political rights of certain securities traders. Unfortunately, the real
picture of insider trading criminal enforcement under Article 180 of
the Criminal Law is obscured because criminal judgments in the PRC
are not publicized or reasoned in the way most civil and administrative law cases are. Instead, criminal defendants are simply reported
by the government or media to be guilty of "insider trading" and subject to criminal punishment.8 3 Given the CSRC's very cavalier
attitude towards extra-legal insider trading enforcement in the administrative sphere, it is not unreasonable to think that the People's
Procuratorate-as advised by the expert agency charged with enforcement, the CSRC-also uses the defective Insider Trading
Guidance Provisions as the basis for criminal enforcement.
80. PRC Law on Administrative Punishments, supra note 3, art. 55.

81. Id. art. 3(ii).
82. Id. art. 4(ii).
83. See, e.g., the 2007-8 reports of criminal insider trading breaches by New
China Life Insurance Chairman Guan Guoliang and Guomei Electronics founder
Huang Guangyu. See Yu Ning, Su Dandan & Li Minhua, 'Neiburen" Guan Guoliang
["Insider"Guan Guoliang], CAMING, May 28, 2007, at 40-50; and Yu Ning, Li Qing &
Luo Chanping, Huang Guangyu Wu [The Huang Guangyu Fog], CAIJING, Dec. 8, 2008,
at 96-104.
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CHALLENGES TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF ILLEGAL NORMS

It is one thing to assert, pursuant to a close analysis like the one
here, that the CSRC's 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions
should be understood as void and unenforceable. It is another thing
to understand what real (i.e., actually applicable) externally-imposed
constraints there are on the enforcement of norms like these in the
contemporary Chinese legal system. Potential external constraints
are significant indiciaof what can be termed a "rule of law" system as
contrasted with a "rule by law" system: If any state actor (or indeed
anyone with a monopoly on coercive power) is able to articulate and
apply norms against citizens and corporate entities with no basis in
the law, or norms which conflict with or exceed the scope of law and
legal norms, then rule by law is being implemented. If, instead, state
actors (or, again, anyone with an apparent monopoly on coercive
power) can be checked by an external force or institution in their attempted assertion of norms with no basis in the law, or which conflict
with or exceed the scope of law and legal norms, then there are at
least the beginnings of rule of law.
Certainly, the Party-state government of the PRC has understood this in some measure and in certain sectors (all, alas, outside of
the criminal law sphere). Precisely "why"-whether to conform to
some idea of "modernity" or to maintain legitimacy, or by some other
calculation-remains a deeply contested point and is beyond the
scope of this Article. Suffice to say that this political-legal understanding explains the multiple exhortations over the past decade by
the PRC State Council urging "administration according to law," forbidding state administrative action not authorized in law,
condemning state administrative action that is ultra vires, and encouraging the application of legally-stipulated constraints on state
administrative power. As the State Council states up front in its 2010
policy document, "administration according to law (yifa xingzheng) is
a key component of rule of law (yifa zhiguo)."84 At the same time
these exhortations indicate that the status quo ante in China at present is anything but "administration according to law."
Accordingly, the analysis undertaken in this Part V is significant
not only for a better understanding of China's securities regulatory
regime, but of critical importance for an understanding of the possibilities for, and application of, legal norms in the service of "rule of
law" for China's national governance system. In this section I briefly
outline possible external checks available both to appellate institutions (agency and judicial) and to private actors who have illegal
norms visited on them. I present these challenges with respect to: (i)
84. Rule of Law Government Opinion, supra note 6, art. 1.
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the enforceability of non-legal, non-regulatory, norms; (ii) administrative enforcement; and (iii) criminal enforcement.
Notwithstanding the State Council's encouragement of private
challenges seeking to hold administrative agencies in check or accountable and promote "administration under law" and "rule of law
government," one must note the extreme difficulty of pursuing such
private challenges given the peculiar architecture of China's system
for the review of administrative norms and criminal law, abstract or
as applied. Indeed, the serious difficulties tied to establishment of a
legal claim against the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, and
their enforcement, can make a jaded analyst conclude that the CSRC
purposely designed its basic insider trading enforcement regime so as
to insulate it from any external, legal, check. Accordingly, the greater
hope for such checks must continue to lie with China's developing
judiciary, acting under its own institutional power to block or overturn asserted administrative (or criminal) enforcement.8 5
A.

Enforceability of the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions qua
Non-legal and Non-regulatory Norms

With regard to the "legal force" of the Insider Trading Guidance
Provisions, Professor Cui Wei of the China University of Politics and
Law has argued that the Law on Legislation suggests that legal and
regulatory norms not addressed in that statute do not "have the force
of law." 86 Professor Cui also highlights the PRC judiciary's consistently articulated view of what norms are enforceable before the
courts, distinguishing between "formal regulations" (which are) and
"interpretations for specific application" and "normative documents"
(which are not). In support, he cites the Supreme People's Court
statement from a 2003 national judicial conference in Shanghai that
although "agencies frequently rely on such interpretations .

.

. and

other normative documents as the basis for specific administrative
actions," they are not "formal sources of law, and do not have the
binding force of legal norms."8 7 As Professor Cui concludes:
85. As I have written elsewhere, this hope is not entirely baseless given the dynamic development seen in contemporary Chinese law and society, and the PRC's
economic and governance systems, at least in sectors less central to the Communist
Party's continuing rule and its paramount mission of social and political control. See
Nicholas Calcina Howson, CorporateLaw in the ShanghaiPeople'sCourts, 1992-2008:
Judicial Autonomy in a Contemporary Authoritarian State, 5 E. AsiA L. REV. 303
(2010).
86. See Cui, supra note 7, at 78 ("While the statute does not state anywhere that
no other type of documents issued by government entities have the force of law and
that the rules governed by it are the exclusive sources of law, it strongly implies so.
This is because the central purpose of the [Law on Legislation] is to bring consistency
and uniformity to the Chinese legal system, and its ability to do so would be severely
limited if rules with the force of law are not governed and ordered by it.").
87. Id. at 82, citing to "Meeting Minutes Regarding the Application of Legal
Norms in Reviewing Administrative Cases" (Sup. People's Ct. Doc. fa (2004) No. 96,
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The message of the [20031 Shanghai Meeting Minutes
seems clear: government pronouncements with lesser authority than regulations are not legally binding, and will be
given effect only at a court's discretion. This message is also
entirely consistent with the [Law on Legislation's] view of
what has the force of law.
A useful adjunct to Professor Cui's argument-applicable to both
administrative decisions and court judgments-is the PRC Supreme
People's Court's October 2009 directive which prohibits any administrative agency or court from citing in any decision to (i.e., basing its
adjudication on) norms such as the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions.88 This directive may be the reason why the CSRC
administrative enforcement decisions analyzed here do not refer to
the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions even when the subject insider trading breach can only be made out under the Guidance
Provisions and not the governing statute.8 9
Thus, even assuming for a moment that the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions conform to the regulatory command in the 2006
PRC Securities Law and that they are not ultra vires, there is a theoretical argument that the Guidance Provisions, as a species of norm
inferior to "regulations," can be understood as potentially unenforceable, or as merely enforceable at the discretion of a PRC court. The
argument is relatively weak, however, precisely because of the widespread and continuing use and enforcement of sub-legal or subregulatory norms, including the large volume of "normative documents," in contemporary China.
B.

Challenges to Administrative Enforcement

Under Chinese law, facial challenge or abstract review of administrative norms can be applied via at least three channels:
administrative reconsideration, administrative litigation, or in the
criminal enforcement sphere and where the judiciary is involved
under the Law on Legislation.
issued by the Sup. People's Ct., May 18, 2004), at sec. 1. Cui Wei continues: "Nonetheless, if a court, when adjudicating a case relating to specific administrative actions,
determines that such interpretation or normative document possesses 'legal validity,
effectiveness, reasonableness and appropriateness,' it may give effect to such interpretation or document in determining whether the specific administrative act has a
legal basis."
88. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Caipan Wenshu Yinyong Fali, Fagui
Deng Guifanxing Fali Wenjian De Guiding [Supreme People's Court Regulations Regarding Citation of Laws, Administrative Regulations, Normative Legal Documents,
etc. in Judgment Opinions] (passed by the Sup. People's Ct. Adjudication Comm. July
13, 2009, promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct. and effective, Nov. 4, 2009), available
at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law-view.asp?id=300043 [hereinafter, Supreme People's Court Citation Regulations].
89. See supra Part IV, and Appendix I infra.
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A kind of abstract review of administrative norms is permitted in
China for parties subject to enforcement pursuant to the administrative reconsideration (xingzheng fuyi) process under the PRC
Administrative Reconsideration Law (ARL).9 0 The ARL allows for reconsideration of certain norms that are alleged to be "illegal" (bu hefa
de). 9x However, abstract reconsideration can only be applied to "legislative provisions of State Council departments" (guowuyuan bumen
de gui'ding) and not to "State Council departmental or commission
rules" (guowuyuan bu, weiyuanhui guizhang). Because the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions do not rise to the level of
"departmental or commission rules" (guizhang), much less "legislative provisions" (gui'ding), the CSRC Guidance Provisions would
seem to fall outside of the scope of administrative or regulatory
norms subject to reconsideration under the ARL.
The Administrative Litigation Law proves equally unhelpful for
private claims seeking to challenge any properly-issued administrative norms on their face, because that Law provides no affirmative
legal basis for abstract review of such norms by the PRC judiciary
(permitting only judicial review of specific administrative acts).9 2
There is the possibility of abstract review under the Law on Legislation, but it does not entitle private claimants. The Law on
Legislation mechanism is grounded in Article 88(3) of that statute,
under which the PRC State Council has the power to annul any departmental rules that are "inappropriate."93 This architecture makes
initiatives difficult in the present context for at least two reasons.
First, to qualify as the object of a Law on Legislation Article 88(3)based State Council annulling, the Insider Trading Guidance Provi90. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Fuyi Fa [PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Apr.
29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999, amended by Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 27, 2009),
available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&ID=5279. In 2010,
the CSRC issued an Order No. 69, its own "Measures for Administrative Reconsideration" (issued by the CSRC May 4, 2010, effective July 1, 2010), available at http://
The
www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/GO0306201/201005/t20100505_180043.htm.
CSRC measures only address reconsideration of specific administrative acts (perArticle 6 of the PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law), and do not countenance the
abstract administrative reconsideration authorized in Article 7 of the PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law.
91. See PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law, supra note 90, art. 7.
92. See The PRC Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 72, art. 12, and Supreme People's Court Administrative Litigation Law Interpretation, supra note 71,
art. 3, and infra notes 97-98, and text.
93. Those hoping for a PRC-style constitutional challenge will be disappointed.
There is no possibility the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions can be annulled by
the NPC Standing Committee under Article 88(2) of the Law on Legislation after a
"citizen proposal" under Article 90(2) of the Law on Legislation, because the CSRC
Insider Trading Guidance Provisions are created by a department/commission under
the PRC State Council, and thus are not "administrative regulations" issued by the
State Council itself (xingzheng fagui), the latter being the proper subject of Law on
Legislation Articles 90(2) and 88(2) constitutional review claims and procedures.

HeinOnline -- 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 989 2012

990

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 60

sions would have to be understood as "departmental rules"
(guizhang) under the scheme set forth in the Law on Legislation. I
have demonstrated above why the Guidance Provisions do not in any
way qualify as "departmental rules." Second, the Law on Legislation
does not permit a private action in connection with State Council review of departmental rules. Instead, the State Council acts sua
sponte, and only after "filing for the record" (bei'an) of a given departmental rule with the State Council, and then examination of it by the
State Council at the State Council's option. Thus, it would be entirely
up to the State Council, on its own initiative, to declare that the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions are "inappropriate" on their face
for the reasons described in this Article-a weak and not very "external" constraint.
Challenge or review of concrete administrative enforcement acts
by the CSRC pursuant to the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions
holds somewhat greater promise.
First, under the ARL an insider trading defendant can apply for
"reconsideration" of a concrete administrative sanction (including a
fine or confiscation of illegal gains or property) or a compulsory administrative measure (including the sealing, seizing or freezing of
property). 94 Administrative enforcement of the insider trading
prohibitions by the CSRC usually involves both concrete administrative sanctions (disgorgement of unjust enrichment and payment of
fines) and compulsory administrative measures (sealing and seizing).
The 2008 Regulations of the PRC on Open Government Information
also encourage-but do not provide a legal basis for-administrative
reconsideration if "citizens . .. believe [that] a specific administrative
action of an administrative agency in its open government work has
infringed their lawful rights and interests."9 5 Similarly, the PRC Law
on Administrative Punishments9 6 provides a legal basis for reconsideration of administrative punishments. Of course, any ARL-based
reconsideration claim will be hampered by the fact that such reconsideration is effected by the same administrative agency being
challenged, i.e., the CSRC.
Second, the Administrative Litigation Law provides for private
claims challenging the legality of specific administrative acts. In this
case, there would be two claims by any party against which illegal
enforcement has been effected: (i) that the Insider Trading Guidance
Provisions are a type of norm that does not have legal force;9 7 and (ii)
94. PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law, supra note 90, art. 6. As noted
above, supra note 90, the CSRC's own reconsideration measures only address reconsideration of specific administrative acts.
95. Regulations of the PRC on Open Government Information, supra note 5, art.
33(2).
96. PRC Law on Administrative Punishments, supra note 3, art. 6.
97. See supra notes 86-87, and text.
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that the concrete act (i.e., any specific administrative enforcement of
the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions) is in conflict with the 2006
PRC Securities Law structure for insider trading and is in violation
of the PRC Law on Administrative Punishments. 9 8 The Regulations
of the PRC on Open Government Information and the PRC Law on
Administrative Punishments encourage administrative litigation in
just this situation. However, any administrative litigation attack
against a CSRC fine or forced disgorgement of ill-gotten gains would
have to employ the concept articulated in the Supreme People's
Court's 2000 Administrative Litigation Law Interpretation making
"administrative guidance acts possessing coercive force" justiciable.
Only if penalties levied pursuant to the Insider Trading Guidance
Provisions are understood as "administrative guidance acts possessing coercive force" could they be challenged under the Administrative
Litigation Law. This line of attack could present difficulties for claimants, because enforcement based solely on the Insider Trading
Guidance Provisions is not action resulting from or related to an administrative guidance act, but instead a departmentalor commission
guidance act.
C.

Challenges to Criminal Enforcement

In the criminal law and enforcement sphere, there appears to be
little chance of abstract review of the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions as a norm inconsistent with law or the Constitution. Abstract
review under the ARL reconsideration process would not be available
because there is no administrative norm at issue (the challenge
would focus on the application of Article 180 of the PRC Criminal
Law, albeit as strongly informed by the Insider Trading Guidance
Provisions). As noted above, abstract review is not available under
the Administrative Litigation Law even where there is an identifiable administrative norm being used, and the Administrative
Litigation Law does not in any case address enforcement of criminal
norms.
An attack against concrete application of the Insider Trading
Guidance Provisions in the criminal context (via Article 180 of the
PRC Criminal Law) looks more promising. If indeed criminal penalties are imposed pursuant to the non-public and ultra vires Insider
Trading Guidance Provisions, then that specific instance of criminal
enforcement will be in violation of a host of important PRC legal
98. For the reasons set forth at supra notes 80-82, and text (forbidding administrative punishments imposed without a statutory basis, invalidating administrative
punishments imposed not in accordance with law, and mandating imposition of administrative punishments only in accordance with publicly-promulgated norms).
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norms, including the Law on Legislation,99 the PRC Criminal Law, 00
and the PRC Constitution. 0 '
In fact, in criminal enforcement a specific challenge seeking a
judicial declaration that the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions are "void" is not even necessary. On appeal and re-hearing, a
PRC court would simply decline to apply the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions or overturn their application in the first level
adjudication, and reverse the conviction. 102
The difficulty of any such challenge arises from the context in
which it would be made-on appeal by a detained defendant who admits some kind of insider trading, just not the insider trading
specifically described in the 2006 PRC Securities Law (and by extension the PRC Criminal Law). The relative lack of legal sophistication,
and the radical imbalance of power, understood to persist in the criminal enforcement context in China means that the criminal
defendant, or his or her counsel, might have a very difficult time raising such a complex challenge on appeal, and an even greater problem
having it understood and acted upon by the Procuratorate and the
sitting judges (or the political-legal and adjudication committees behind them).
VI.

CONCLUSION

To my knowledge, neither the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance
Provisions nor any enforcement of the insider trading prohibition
pursuant to the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions has ever been
subject to challenge or reversal in the civil or criminal spheres. 03
This can mean several things. While the possible legal claims are of
varying strength and feasibility, one can conclude that in China there
is a continuing high tolerance for the enforcement of defective and
illegal norms in the securities regulation sphere (as well as in other
areas of administrative governance).
The basic illegality underlying China's insider trading prohibitions and enforcement analyzed in this Article, the failure of the
99. PRC Law on Legislation, supra note 60, arts. 8 and 9 state that measures and
punishments that deprive citizens of their political rights or restrict their personal
freedoms can only be established in law.
100. PRC Criminal Law, supra note 17, art. 3, which provides that "[flor acts that
are explicitly defined as criminal acts in the [Criminal] Law, the offenders shall be
convicted and punished in accordance with law; otherwise they shall not be convicted
or punished" (emphasis added).
101.

ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [CONSTITUTION OF THE

PRC] art. 37

(1982), which mandates that the deprivation or restriction of citizens' personal freedom must be pursuant to "law."
102. Here, any appellate court reviewing a criminal judgment rendered pursuant
to the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions could also rely on the Supreme People's
Court Citation Regulations, supra note 88, which prohibit a court from citing to the
Insider Trading Guidance Provisions to convict or uphold a conviction.
103. See supra notes 94-98, and text.
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specific administrative agency with jurisdiction to remedy the situation, 104 and the high level of tolerance shown by market participants
subject to such illegal enforcement, all provide important insights regarding China's efforts to establish even thin "rule of law" after more
than three decades. This is especially apparent because the rulemaking and ultra vires defects in this particular case are so egregious, and have been visited upon relatively sophisticated, welleducated, largely urban, property rights-wielding investors, and because the regulated transactions are economic and financial, not
political or oppositional in nature. Contrast the situation described
here with the distinct circumstance seen throughout China, where
local authorities assess "fees" or "taxes" pursuant to ad hoc commands not based in formal law or regulation, and extract huge sums
from ill-educated, relatively cowed, peasant populations. In that alternate world, we might expect autocratic behavior from the local
government. More importantly, we might also expect that autocratic
behavior to be met with relative passivity by the governed, with no
dispute from either side regarding a "legal basis" for the exaction,
conformity of government behavior with legal or regulatory authorization, or due process, transparency, consistency, predictability, and
real constraints on the government (at least until the charges aggregate to an unsustainable burden, whereupon the recourse is not to
law, but "mass action").
From the agency or CSRC side, the phenomenon described here
affirms intimations of a continuing top-down, policy-based, enforcement-directed and largely unaccountable orientation among the
PRC's government administration units, acting in ways reminiscent
of the imperial-era magistrate. At this time, one can only speculate as
to why the CSRC-China's most "modern," politically independent
and technically competent regulator-chose in 2007 to establish and
then enforce non-public and clearly ultra vires extra-legal norms like
the Insider Trading Guidance Provisions. Perhaps, as implied above,
it did so precisely in order to seize the broadest possible scope of enforcement power while insulating the defective norms from legal
challenge. Or perhaps, and now focusing on the failure to make "public" the ultra vires enforcement norms, it is a throwback to the longstanding distaste for the codification of laws in pre-imperial and imperial China.' 0 5 At first glance, this possibility may seem absurd, but
104. As all administrative agencies have been urged to do since 2004, and as the
State Taxation Administration under the PRC Ministry of Finance did in its separate
sphere in July 2010. See Administration According to Law Outline, supra note 4, and
Cui, supra note 7, at 89-94.
105. Embodied in pre-Confucian Shu Xiang's alleged sixth century BCE letter to
Legalist tradition-law drafter Zi Chan recorded in the third century BCE compilation
known as the Zuo ZHUAN [COMMENTARY OF Zuol. See Derk Bodde's translation (based
on Legge's original translation) at DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIs, LAW IN IMPERIAL
CHINA: EXEMPLIFIED BY 190 CH'ING DYNASTY CASES 16-17 (1967). The same ideas
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even if one ignores the long tradition of discretionary application of
non-public norms through the imperial era and China's post-1928
and post-1949 single party regimes-just this attitude was invoked
in 2007 by Shenzhen stock exchange officials: when asked to explain
why standards determining market misconduct were not made public, these officials pointed to the lack of sophistication of the Chinese
capital markets, and said that "if the companies were aware of the
specific standards, they might manipulate their disclosure so as to
avoid sanctions."1 0 6 Regardless of why the CSRC created the Insider
Trading Guidance Provisions in the way they did, the fact that the
problem appears under the administration of the CSRC means it can
be assumed to exist even more in the approaches taken by older-line
agencies and departments. 0 7
What does this illegality in the design and enforcement of insider
trading in China signify more broadly for the Chinese legal system?
Carl Minzner and a number of other scholars and journalists have
identified China's "turn against law" in recent years. 0 8 In my view,
the problem highlighted in this Article does not fit well into the "turn
against law" account, even assuming it is accurate. Several reasons
militate against such an account. First, the insider trading enforcement problem has nothing to do with the major focus of the "turn
against law" complaint-broad central, state or Communist Party
rhetoric about law and legal institutions, the desired politicization
and adherence to a "mass line" of those institutions, or the way in
which formal legal institutions are said to operate-and everything
to do with how an expert agency actually applies the law and delegated power in a technically complex area way below the radar of
public perception or macro-level political-legal discourse. Even in application, the insider trading enforcement problem does not evidence
de-legalization or any rejection of law, but instead misapplication of
law or legally-delegated authority. Second, the illegal design and enforcement of the CSRC's insider trading prohibition in China existed
long before the largely rhetorical "turn against law" presently lamented, and therefore seems more firmly rooted in long-held
(imperial era-origin) and continuing understandings about the power
made it a crime to have access to, or possess texts of, the penal law in the Song Dynasty (960-1279 C.E.). See Miyazaki Ichisada, The Administration of Justice During
the Sung Dynasty, in EssAYs ON CHINA'S LEGAL TRADITION 56-75 (Jerome A. Cohen et
al. eds., 1980).
106. See Liebman & Milhaupt, supra note 9, at 950.
107. And is known to exist in the tax administration sphere. See Cui, supra note 7.
108. See Carl Minzner, China's Turn Against Law, 59 Am. J. COMP. L. 935 (2011)
(focusing on central rhetoric about recourse to law and the politicization of legal institutions) and Keith Hand, Resolving ConstitutionalDisputes in Contemporary China,
7 E. ASIA L. REv. 51, 53-54, n.5 (2012) (citing similar laments by journalist Evan
Osnos, human rights advocate Joshua Rosensweig, and law professors/rights lawyers
Jiang Ping, Teng Biao, and Fu Hualing).
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and discretion afforded administrative actors in China, and the relationship of those institutions to law and legal institutions.
A slightly more helpful, if still very partial, answer may be derived from Ben Liebman's work on contemporary China's "legal
populism."1 0 9 Liebman discusses how judicial institutions in China
can and do submit to populist pressure, in ways which are sometimes
directly contrary to substantive law or promised legal procedure. In
the present case, my focus is primarily on a different kind of state
actor, an administrative agency with enforcement powers acting in a
highly technical and often opaque area unlikely to attract popular
interest. Still, the institutional receptivity to populist pressure may
explain how the CSRC (and the Procuratorate in criminal enforcement) feels emboldened to act lawlessly in using "bad law" against
"bad actors." Proceeding against identified securities fraudsters, the
CSRC has-or can conjure-populist rage at its back, if not the law.
From the defendant side, these issues, and the paucity of legal
challenges directed towards faulty norm-production and unlawful enforcement against China's most sophisticated and empowered civil
actors, show us something equally disheartening: a continuing high
tolerance for an administrative law establishment that does not act
in conformity with law. This ultimately means a feeble constraint on
state (and Communist Party) overreach.
What does this tell us about the "consumers" of rule of law in
China today, and about their attitudes towards governance in accordance with law and robust legal accountability? As demonstrated in
the broad and raucous clamor for a private right of action against
issuers, underwriters, accountants, directors, officers and controlling
shareholders in respect of securities issuance fraud and misrepresentation, 11 0 the domestic capital markets sector is hardly an area where
retail and institutional market participants, or their legal counsel,
have remained passive or ignorant of adequate remedies. Indeed, we
see sustained recourse to legal institutions and explicitly legal challenges in the far more sensitive sphere of civil and political rights, in
both the rural and urban settings." 1
109. See Benjamin L. Liebman, A Populist Threat to China's Courts?, in CHINESE
269-313 (Mary Gallagher & Margaret Woo eds., 2011); and Benjamin L. Liebman, A Return to Populist
Legality? Historical Legacies and Legal Reform, in MAO'S INVISIBLE HAND 165-200
(Elizabeth Perry & Sebastian Heilmann eds., 2011).
110. See Howson, supra note 85, at 303, 401-04; Donald C. Clarke & Nicholas
Calcina Howson, Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions in
JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA

the People's Republic of China, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 258 (Daniel Puchniak et al. eds., 2012); Hui Huang, "Pri-

vate Enforcement of Securities Law in China: A Ten Year Retrospective" (working
paper (May 2012) on file with author).
111.

See, e.g., CHEN GUIDI & WU CHUNTAO, ZHONGUO NONGMIN DIAOCHA BAOGAO

[CHINA PEASANTS INVESTIGATION REPORT] (2004); Mary Gallagher, "Use the Law as

Your Weapon!" InstitutionalChange and Legal Mobilization in China, in ENGAGING
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Yet, I would argue that in the world of securities trading the actors are different, with different kinds of leverage, and different
expectations. Moreover, the legal challenges to the CSRC's rule making and enforcement practice are highly complex and technical. In the
situation analyzed in this Article, there is only a single defendant (or
a small group of defendants), usually actually guilty of trading on the
basis of non-public, material, information, facing the much more powerful CSRC or People's Procuratorate. Defective enforcement against
insider trading in China is therefore characterized by a basic power
imbalance between the enforcement agency and insider trading defendants, an ex ante understanding of moral guilt in the minds of
defendants, a post-investigatory period information asymmetry, the
strong expectation of deserved fine or punishment, and decidedly
"populist" pressure supporting enforcement against individuals
caught manipulating the securities markets for private gain. In addition, as mentioned, the available legal challenges to the CSRC's 2007
Insider Trading Guidance Provisions and their enforcement are
highly technical. Contrast the problem described here to the other
situations in China where vigorous legal challenges to state action
are made, such as eviction from land without legal basis, appropriate
process, or compensation, or the inability to access counsel or to
cross-examine witnesses in criminal proceedings. In these latter situations, the legal objection to enforcement is relatively clear cut and
thus easily invoked by even minimally competent counsel. Is it reasonable to assume that insider trading defendants would think of (or
retain lawyers who would counsel) a very sophisticated legal challenge to the insider trading enforcement regime itself, or the way it is
applied by the agency directly charged with enforcement? Probably
not. In the future, however, it is precisely this kind of sophisticated
legal challenge to state power and enforcement, in any area, which
will prove the effectiveness of external legal constraints generally
and progress towards authentic "rule of law" in China.

(Neil J. Diamant &
Kevin O'Brien eds., 2005); Keith Hand, Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun
Zhigang Incident and Evolving Forms of Citizen Action in the People's Republic of
China, 45 COLUM. J. TRANs. L. 114 (2006); KEVIN O'BRIEN & LIANGJIAN Li, RIGHTFUL
RESISTANCE IN RURAL CHINA (2006); C.K. LEE, AGAINST THE LAW: LABOR PROTESTS IN
CHINA'S RUSTBELT AND SUNBELT (2007); Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, Weiquan
(RightsProtection)Lawyering in an AuthoritarianState: Building a Culture of Public
Interest Lawyering, 59 CHINA J. 111 (2008); Xiao Han, Qunti Peichang: Quanyi Yi
Jiuan [Mass Compensation:Rights and Stability], CAIJING, Oct. 13, 2008, at 152-153;
and a great deal of other scholarship, journalism and advocacy charting the rise of
(legal) rights consciousness and demands on legal institutions in the PRC, and the
various forms of state and Communist Party pushback.
LAw IN CHINA: STATE, SOCIETY AND POSSIBILITIES FOR JUSTICE
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APPENDIX I-SUMMARIES OF SELECTED CSRC INSIDER TRADING
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

Lin Shiguan-Trading in Shares of Yantai Xinchao
Enterprise Co., Ltd. (June 29, 2011)112
The controlling shareholders of Yantai Xinchao Enterprise Co.,
Ltd. (Yantai Xinchao) began negotiating a sale of equity in Yantai
Xinchao on March 22, 2011, and Yantai Xinchao made public disclosure of a possible change of control on May 15, 2011. Defendant Lin
Shiquan learned about the negotiations for a change of control transaction on March 24, 2011 (the decision does not indicate how, or why,
Lin learns of the possible transaction, and whether he is a statutory
PWKII under Article 74 of the 2006 PRC Securities Law or is proven
to have misappropriated information under Articles 73 and 76), and
on March 25, 2011 purchased 400,000 shares of Yantai Xinchao at
renminbi (RMB) 6.69-6.72 yuan per share. After public disclosure of
the possible change of control on May 15, 2011, on May 24, 2011, Lin
sold his 400,000 shares for RMB 6.85-6.91 yuan per share, for total
proceeds of RMB 2.75 million yuan and a trading profit of RMB
55,570 yuan. The CSRC levies a penalty equal to the trading profit,
confirming that Lin is being penalized for insider trading pursuant to
Article 202 of the 2006 PRC Securities Law. Of interest in the case is
the care with which the CSRC identifies the news of a possible
change of control as a "major event" for the issuer, qualifying it as
"inside information" pursuant to Article 75 of the 2006 PRC Securities Law. Importantly, however, the CSRC does not indicate how Lin
qualifies as one of the Article 74-enumerated persons, stating in conclusory terms that on March 24, 2011 he became a "person with
knowledge of inside information." He is not identified as an officer or
shareholder of the selling controlling shareholder of the issuer, although he is identified as the top executive of another entity which
may be a shareholder of the issuer holding more than five percent of
the issuer per Article 74(ii). This crucial fact basis is not set out in the
decision.
Liu Yang-Trading in Shares of ST Zhongwu Co., Ltd.
(June 14, 2011)113
Liu Yang is a senior officer of Hunan Construction Engineering
Group Holdings Company (Hunan Construction Engineering) which
begins considering a listing by reverse merger into several already112. Zhongguo Zhengjiannhui Xingzheng Chufa Juedingshu (Lin Shiquan) [CSRC
Administrative Punishment Decision (Lin Shiquan)] (2011) No. 26, issued June 29,
2011, available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306212/201108/t201108
02198433.htm.
113. Zhongguo Zhengjianhui Xingzheng Chufa Juedingshu (Liu Yang) [CSRC
Administrative Punishment Decision (Liu Yang)] (2011) No. 24, issued June 14, 2011,

HeinOnline -- 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 997 2012

998

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 60

listed entities, including ST Zhongwu Co., Ltd. (Zhongwu). Liu Yang
is one of the executives in charge of the proposed transaction, and
specifically liaison with the Hunan State-owned Assets Bureau (the
governing department for each of the reverse merger candidates),
which department confirms directly to Liu Yang on August 21, 2009
that only Zhongwu is available for the transaction. On September 29,
2009, the Hunan State-owned Assets Bureau formally approves
Zhongwu as the target, and on the same day the chairman of
Zhongwu's largest shareholder agrees to the same plan with the
chairman of Zhongwu. On October 20, 2009, Zhongwu issues a "major
event" report to the market, describing the proposed transaction,
whereupon its shares cease trading. The CSRC determines that the
period between September 29 (government approval of the transaction) and October 20, 2009 (public disclosure of the transaction) is the
time period when there is inside information not yet made public, and
further demonstrates that Liu Yang, through a friend named Xie and
his or her securities account, spent RMB 4,181,624.91 yuan to
purchase 421,000 shares of Zhongwu between October 15 and 19,
2009. In the event, Liu Yang fails to make serious gains on Zhongwu
stock because on November 16, 2009 Zhongwu issues another "major
event" report, detailing the breakdown of the takeover plan, on which
day its shares commenced trading again. On the day of the second
announcement and the re-start of trading, Zhongwu shares decline
1.61% to RMB 10.38 yuan per share. Liu Yang sells his shares in
Zhongwu on November 18, 2009, showing a small net profit of RMB
11,212.83 yuan. Most interesting in the decision, and indicative of
how liberally the CSRC applies Article 74 of the 2006 PRC Securities
Law, is that Liu Yang is pronounced "a person with knowledge of inside information" simply because he "participated in . .. [the reverse
merger] related affairs." This is not the same thing as what is provided for under Article 74(iv) ("persons who are able to obtain
relevant inside information concerning the company by virtue of the
position they hold in the company"), which is unavailable precisely
because Liu Yang comes into possession of important information
about a company (Zhongwu) different from the one he is employed by
(Hunan Construction Engineering). The CSRC makes no effort to
base Liu Yang's liability in the misappropriation prong of the statute.

available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306212/201107/t20110718_1976
05.htm.
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Jia Huazhang and Liu Rong-Trading in Shares of Xintai
Science and Technology Co., Ltd. (December 21, 2010)114
This decision addresses a somewhat conventional husband and
wife insider trading scheme: On April 26, 2006, the second largest
shareholder of listed company Xintai Science and Technology Co.,
Ltd. (Xintai) agrees to sell its 26.81% stake in Xintai, which agreement is reported publicly on April 29, 2006. Ms. Liu Rong, the wife of
Jia Huazhang, purchases shares of Xintai after the agreement is
struck and before it is disclosed to the market, on April 26 (2,300
shares) and April 27 (5,000) shares. Liu Rong later sells 300 shares in
Xintai, on May 24, 2006, gaining a net profit of RMB 5,039 yuan. In
terms of application of the law, the decision is problematic in several
ways. First, the husband Jia Huazheng is simply declared to be a
"person with knowledge of inside information" without tying his status to the enumerated persons under Article 74 of the 2006 PRC
Securities Law. Nor is he independently identified as a misappropriater under Article 76. He may be a "tipper" of inside
information, but as he is neither a "person with knowledge of inside
information" nor a misappropriator, he is not subject to the tipping
prohibition under Article 76. Thus, as a person who has merely come
into possession of inside information, it is unclear how he is an insider trading defendant under the statute. Second, Jia's wife, Liu
Rong, is a "tippee" of inside information, and again there is no tie up
between her possession of the information and any kind of misappropriation. So, she is not an appropriate defendant under Article 76 of
the PRC 2006 Securities Law.
Zhang Xiaojian-Trading in Shares of Guilin Jigi
Pharmaceuticals Enterprise Co., Ltd. (December 6, 2010)115
In this decision, Zhang Xiaojian is the vice-president of a PRC
securities firm which agrees to advise on the reorganization of a
troubled listed company, Guilin Jiqi Pharmaceuticals Enterprise Co.,
Ltd. (Jiqi). Discussions on the transaction are initiated and settled
between the defendant's securities firm and Jiqi during the week of
November 7-14, 2006 in Beijing, with the parties agreeing that the
deal will involve a significant change in the capital structure of Jiqi.
On December 13, 2006, public disclosure of the transaction and the
change in capital structure was effected. In the period after the nego114. Zhongguo Zhengjianhui Xingzheng Chufa Juedingshu (Jia Huazhang Liu
Rong) [CSRC Administrative Punishment Decision (Jia Huazhang and Liu Rong)]
(2010) No. 53, issued Dec. 21, 2010, available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/
G00306212/201103/t20110302_192554.htm.
115. Zhongguo Zhengjianhui Xingzheng Chufa Juedingshu (Zhang Xiaojian)
[CSRC Administrative Punishment Decision (Zhang Xiaojian)] (2010) No. 44, issued
Dec. 6, 2010, available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306212/201102/t2
0110223192241.htm.
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tiations and before public disclosure, Zhang Xiaojian used his
younger brother's securities trading account at the same securities
firm to purchase shares of Jiqi, on November 14 (493,000 shares) and
again on November 22 (32,000 shares). There is no indication in the
decision that Zhang Xiaojian sold the shares purchased during the
price sensitive period, or profited from his purchase based on inside
information. As in the Liu Yang CSRC decision above, Zhang
Xiaojian is identified as a "person with knowledge of inside information" simply because he met with the chairman of his own securities
firm in Beijing on November 13, 2006 and thereafter "participated" in
implementation of the transaction regarding "Jiqi." This style of identification by the CSRC is odd, because Zhang Xiaojian might fit
rather comfortably within the terms of the 2006 PRC Securities Law
Article 74(vi) ("personnel of securities service institutions"). It is yet
another example of how the CSRC will rather liberally enforce
against people trading on inside information simply by virtue of their
access to such inside information, regardless of whether or not they
fit neatly into the enumerated class of defendants under Article 74.
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APPENDIX II-SELECTED STATUTORY PRovISIoNS

2006 PRC Securities Law
Article 73. It is prohibited for those with knowledge of securities trading [related] inside information or those who have illegally procured
inside information to use inside information in undertaking securities trading activities.
Article 74. Persons with knowledge of securities trading [related] inside information include:
(i) directors, supervisory board members, and senior managers of
the issuer;
(ii) 5% or more shareholders of the company and its/their directors,
supervisory board members and senior managers, and the actual controlling shareholders of the company and its/their
directors, supervisory board members and senior managers;
(iii) directors, supervisory board members and senior managers of
companies controlled by the issuer;11 6
(iv) people whose executive or staff position in the company provides
access to inside information;
(v) Securities Regulatory Organ [CSRC] staff and others who pursuant to their legally stipulated duties administer or regulate
securities issuance and trading;
(vi) relevant securities sponsors, underwriters, securities exchange
personnel, securities registration and settlement personnel, and
securities service institution personnel; and
(vii) other persons stipulated in regulation by the State Council Securities Regulatory Organ [the CSRC1.
Article 75. Inside information means non-public information relevant
to a company's business or financial affairs or which may have a major effect on the market price of that company's securities in the
course of securities trading activities. The following information all
constitutes inside information: . . .(viii) other important information
recognized and confirmed by the State Council Securities Regulatory
Organ [the CSRC] to have a significant effect on the trading price of
securities.
Article 76. Those with knowledge of inside information related to securities trading and those who have illegally procured inside
information may not, prior to public disclosure of the inside information, purchase or sell that company's securities, or disclose such
116. Appropriately adjusted in Article 6(2)(ii) of the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions to mean: "the controlling shareholders of the issuer or listed
company, other companies controlled by the actual control party, and their directors,
supervisory board members and senior management."
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information, or suggest that others purchase or sell such securities
2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions
Article 12. Securities trading activity that conforms to the following
conditions shall constitute insider trading: (1) the person undertaking the behavior is an insider; (2) the information involved is inside
information; and (3) the subject person buys or sells related securities
during the price sensitive period of the inside information, or suggests that other persons buy or sell related securities, or [publicly]
reveals the [inside] information.1 1 7

117. Each of "insider," "inside information," and "price sensitive period" is defined
under the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance Provisions, only one of which ("inside information") is defined under the 2006 PRC Securities Law. As noted in the text of this
Article, the expanded definition of PWKII under the 2007 Insider Trading Guidance
Provisions is folded back into the newly-created and much expanded term "insider."
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